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ABSTRACT
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent law and FDA regulation work
together to determine the timing of generic entry in the market for
drugs. But FDA has sought to avoid any responsibility for reading pat-
ents, insisting that its role in administering the patent provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act is purely ministerial. This gap in regulatory over-
sight has allowed innovators to use irrelevant patents to defer generic
competition. Meanwhile, patent litigation has set the stage for anticom-
petitive settlements rather than adjudication of the patent issues in the
courts. As these settlements have provoked antitrust litigation, antitrust
courts have proven no more willing than FDA to address the merits of
the underlying patent infringement actions, preferring to rely on mis-
leading proxies such as the existence of a “reverse payment” in the
settlement agreement.
Antitrust litigation is, at best, a belated and awkward mechanism for
correcting the effects of improperly delayed generic entry. But FDA is
well-positioned to make timely determinations of which patents meet
the statutory criteria for deferring generic entry. With proper staffing
and resources, FDA could use its expertise in drug regulation to make
rough assessments of the relationship between particular patents and
the scope of FDA approval in NDAs and ANDAs quickly and cheaply,
while leaving patent infringement remedies intact. Only those patents
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that FDA decides could reasonably be asserted against an unautho-
rized generic would lead FDA to stay approval of the generic pending
litigation of the infringement action. The result would be a reduction in
incentives to pursue dubious patent infringement claims, with a corre-
sponding reduction in opportunities for anti-competitive settlements.
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INTRODUCTION
A major challenge for any patent system is the difficulty of determining
the validity and scope of patent rights. Within the core of the patent system,
it may be possible to use skilled experts to examine patent applications and
to adjudicate disputes.1 But ideally, the patent system should also convey
1. Many legal systems throughout the world use specialized tribunals for patent cases.
See INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, STUDY ON SPE-
CIALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURTS (2012), available at http://iipi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/05/Study-on-Specialized-IPR-Courts.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). In the U.S.,
intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent disputes has been consolidated since 1983 in the
semi-specialized Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the Federal Circuit”), created by
Congress under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over appeals from decisions of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, appeals from decisions of
U.S. District Courts in patent cases, and appeals from decisions in the U.S. Court of Claims.
The substantial patent docket of the Federal Circuit gives its judges considerable experience
with patent cases and familiarity with patent law. Many disputed patent issues turn on case-
specific technological questions that might be more effectively handled by providing expertise
at the trial court level. See John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with Speciali-
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information about what it protects to a larger universe of people and institu-
tions that create, disseminate, purchase, utilize, invest in, and regulate new
technologies.2 When these actors make decisions in ignorance, error, or un-
certainty about the protections and limitations of patents, the balance be-
tween patent protection and free access to unpatented and unpatentable
technology is distorted. The more complex the rules and the more uncertain
their application, the less effectively they can guide decisions and motivate
behavior.
Uncertainty about the scope of patent protection may create challenges
in other parts of the legal system. How do regulators and tribunals charged
with administering other legal regimes that interact with the patent system
handle the complexities of patent law? Are they able to summon the re-
sources and expertise they need to make informed and timely decisions?
In at least one context—regulation of the entry of generic versions of
patented drugs—regulators and judges have unapologetically punted on pat-
ent issues, relying on broad default rules, deference to interested parties, and
other flawed proxies to avoid engaging patent issues on the merits. The va-
lidity and scope of drug patents have an important bearing on two types of
recurring legal decisions: the timing of U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval of generic drug products and the antitrust treatment of set-
tlements of related patent infringement litigation between patent holders and
generic competitors. Neither FDA nor the antitrust courts want any part of
the job of evaluating patents and comparing them to the scope of regulatory
approval to determine whether they are relevant to the issues before them
and whether the patents are valid and infringed. The result has been costly
delays and obfuscation of the legal issues.
FDA has long sought to minimize its responsibility to administer the
patent provisions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
zation in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765, 788–89 (2000). Some
District Courts see more patent litigation than others, giving their judges more experience
handling patent cases over time. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation? 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 558 (2001)
(finding that 44% of all patent cases are concentrated in 10 out of 94 U.S. District Courts); cf.
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010) (arguing that restricting
venue in patent infringement litigation to the place of business of a defendant would improve
judicial decision-making in patent cases). Recently Congress established a ten-year pilot pro-
gram to allow certain judges within 14 U.S. District Courts to hear patent cases that other
judges on the same bench decline. Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat.
3674 (2011). These measures make it less likely that the judges who preside over patent litiga-
tion will be averse to that task or inexperienced in patent cases. For an example of such aver-
sion, see Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
2. For a critique of the patent system as failing to provide effective notice of the
boundaries of the rights it creates, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAIL-
URE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009).
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tion Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.3 The Hatch-
Waxman Act is a complex piece of legislation that yokes together patent
protection and drug regulation in an effort to balance the competing goals of
(1) protecting innovators’ incentives to develop new drugs and (2) facilitat-
ing the timely entry of cheaper generic versions of older drugs. The legisla-
tion uses the timing of FDA product approvals to fortify the exclusionary
effects of patents by deferring approval of competing generic products dur-
ing the patent term. FDA relies on the innovators to specify which patents
meet the statutory standards for deferring generic approval, insisting that it
lacks the expertise and resources to second-guess these assertions. It inter-
prets the Hatch-Waxman Act as assigning the job of sorting out the merits of
patent disputes exclusively to the courts,4 leaving FDA with only the “purely
ministerial” tasks of publishing information that the innovators supply5 and
staying approval of generic products for thirty months after the filing of an
infringement action pending instructions from the courts.6 This very strong
default rule gives all patent holders the power to defer generic competition
during an automatic stay, even if the merits of their assertions are too dubi-
ous to allow them to persuade a court to enter a preliminary injunction.
Punting patent disputes to the courts might in some cases lead to thor-
ough (if costly) resolution of the merits through adjudication, perhaps before
an experienced District Court judge who has heard other patent cases,7 and
perhaps with review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit), an appellate court with considerable experience in patent appeals.
But as with most litigation, a more common outcome is settlement. In many
infringement action settlements between pharmaceutical innovators and
generics, the innovator (who has much more to lose than the generic has to
gain from the litigation) has agreed to make payments to the generic in ex-
change for agreement by the generic to defer entry.8 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and drug purchasers have repeatedly sued the settling
3. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 15, 21, 35, and 42 of the
U.S.C.); see infra Part II.
4. Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and
Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New
Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or will Not Be In-
fringed, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,681 (June 18, 2003); Abbreviated New Drug Application
Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338 (Oct. 3, 1994) (codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 314), available at http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-10-03/html/94-24052.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2015).
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b), (c)(2) (2012).
6. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
7. Hatch-Waxman infringement actions tend to cluster in a small number of district
courts. See Fromer, supra note 1, at 1500–02; cf. Moore, supra note 1, at 558.
8. For a review of the terms of these agreements, see C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate
Approach to Antitrust; Using New Data to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
629, 647–57 (2009).
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firms, arguing that these “reverse payments” or “pay for delay” agreements
restrain competition in violation of the antitrust laws.9
The antitrust courts have responded with two divergent patent punting
strategies. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Federal Trade
Commission v. Actavis,10 the lower courts were divided on whether the
agreements were presumptively lawful (due to the existence of an unexpired
patent)11 or presumptively unlawful (due to the payment in exchange for a
promise not to compete).12 The Supreme Court majority in Actavis formally
held that these cases call for rule of reason analysis13 that balances “tradi-
tional antitrust factors such as likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming vir-
tues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in
the circumstances, such as here those related to patents.”14 But the majority
denied that this analysis would require analyzing the merits of the underly-
ing patent disputes, instead inviting the courts to infer from the reverse pay-
ment that the innovator’s patent infringement claim must have been weak,
and the settlement must therefore have been anti-competitive.15 Three dis-
senting Justices would have held that an antitrust court should ask whether
the settlement gives the patent holder monopoly power beyond that con-
ferred by the patent, since a patent provides an exception to antitrust law.16
The dissent and the majority agreed on one thing: it was not the job of the
antitrust courts to analyze the merits of the underlying patent infringement
action.17
The reluctance of both FDA and antitrust courts to engage the merits of
patent disputes is understandable. Analyzing patent validity and infringe-
ment is hard work. Validity analysis requires comparing the invention as
defined in the patent claims to the prior art at a particular moment in the past
9. See infra Part III.
10. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
11. E.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056
(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007); Ark. Carpenters Health
& Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606
(2011); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 557 U.S. 920 (2009).
12. E.g., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 931 (2002); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
13. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (rejecting the
FTC’s proposed “quick look” analysis that would shift the burden to antitrust defendants to
show empirical evidence of “procompetitive effects”).
14. Id. at 2231.
15. Id. at 2236–37.
16. Id. at 2239–40 (viewing uncertainty concerning patent validity as irrelevant to
whether a settlement violates the antitrust laws).
17. See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
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from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art.18 Infringe-
ment analysis requires interpreting patent claims and comparing them to the
product or method of treatment for which the defendant seeks FDA approval
as set forth in an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).19 These de-
terminations require reading patent documents in light of the past under-
standings of practitioners in the relevant technological community,20 a
perspective that may be difficult to access, particularly for generalist judges
with no training in the field of the invention, as well as reading and interpret-
ing documents submitted to FDA seeking regulatory approval to market
drugs. The legal rules are complex and likely to be contested by highly moti-
vated parties. There is considerable room for error. In the antitrust context,
the challenge of evaluating the merits of the patent case is aggravated by the
lack of current conflict between the patent owner and the alleged infringer
since both are now defending the settlement. At this stage only the antitrust
plaintiff has an interest in establishing that the underlying infringement
claim was weak in order to establish that the settlement violated the antitrust
laws.
But the merits of the patent dispute matter. Owners of valid patents have
a legal right to exclude competitors from the market for the patented inven-
tion until the end of the patent term. On the other hand, invalid patents
should not defer generic entry, and even valid patents should not prevent the
entry of products that do not infringe. Settlements of patent infringement
actions may be camouflage for anticompetitive behavior that is not author-
ized by the patent laws, but they may also legitimately resolve plausible but
contested assertions of infringement. The difference turns on the merits.
The mechanisms used by FDA and the courts to avoid having to analyze
the merits themselves are highly flawed. FDA’s reliance on pharmaceutical
innovators to decide which patents call for deferring generic entry effec-
tively assigns the fox to guard the henhouse. Innovators have a strong inter-
est in making dubious assertions of patent infringement. But generics also
18. Since March 16, 2013, U.S. law has conformed to the approach in most other patent
systems, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: A New Para-
digm for International Harmonization?, 24 SING. ACAD. L.J. 669 (2012), by determining prior
art as of the filing date of a patent application, with some limited exceptions for prior art
within one year of the application filing date. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012); Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 3(n), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011). For U.S. patent appli-
cations filed prior to March 16, 2013, prior art is measured as of two different dates: the
invention date and one year prior to the filing date. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2006); Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 3(n), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011). For a compari-
son of statutory language before and after the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, see U.S.
Patent Act After the America Invents Act, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/source/35usc/index
.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
19. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Abbott Labs. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
20. Phillips, 403 F.3d at 1313.
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have a strong interest in raising dubious challenges to validity and infringe-
ment. Someone without a stake in the matter needs to analyze the merits.
Punting patent issues to the courts has often led not to adjudication on
the merits, but rather to settlements on terms that provoke later antitrust
challenges. The shortcuts deployed by antitrust courts to determine whether
litigation settlements violate the antitrust laws rely on poor proxies for con-
sideration of the merits and invite subterfuge in the framing of agreements,
as more fully explained in Part III.21
Even if the antitrust courts were willing to look to the merits of the
settled patent dispute, after-the-fact antitrust litigation over patent settle-
ments is a tardy, costly, and error-prone mechanism for determining when an
innovator’s exclusive rights should end and generic entry should begin.
Time is of the essence in making these determinations. A better system
would resolve more disputes at an earlier stage, with more technological
expertise, and at lower cost, while minimizing opportunities for strategic
gaming. At a minimum, rather than punting all disputes to the courts, and
thereby setting the stage for a maximum number of settlements, the system
should filter out the easiest cases, thereby limiting the opportunity to enter
into possibly collusive agreements to those cases in which the need for full
adjudication justifies the risks of anticompetitive settlements. If the easy
cases never get to litigation, settlements of the remaining cases are more
likely to reflect compromise of genuine disputes rather than camouflage for
anticompetitive agreements.
The obvious candidate for filtering out the easiest disputes, although a
most reluctant one, is FDA. FDA has avoided this job so far by insisting that
it lacks expertise in patent matters, while ignoring the considerable advan-
tages that it has over the courts in the unique context of infringement litiga-
tion under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Rather than the usual infringement
analysis, which compares the claims of a patent to an actual infringing prod-
uct or process, the Hatch-Waxman Act requires a comparison between the
scope of a patent and the scope of FDA approval documents at two different
stages. First, to figure out whether a particular patent is properly submitted
to FDA for listing, it is necessary to determine whether the patent claims a
drug or a method of using a drug that is within the scope of an approved or
pending New Drug Application (NDA). If not, then the patent is irrelevant to
the timing of generic approval. Second, when an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) is filed for a generic version of the product, it is neces-
sary to compare the claims of properly listed patents to the scope of approval
sought in a pending ANDA to determine whether the patent is relevant to the
particular ANDA. If not, then the ANDA need not address that patent in a
certification, and FDA need not defer approval of the ANDA.
21. See infra notes 213–218.
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Whatever the limits of its patent expertise, FDA has a decisive advan-
tage over any other institution in reading NDAs and ANDAs to determine
what drugs and methods of use they cover. Its technical expertise in the field
of drug development may also give it a significant advantage over generalist
courts in reading and understanding drug patent claims from the perspective
of a person having ordinary skill in the art of drug development.
FDA also has the advantage of being in the right place at the right time
to make timely decisions. Congress has given FDA a central role in tracking
and enforcing the pharmaceutical patents covered by the Hatch-Waxman
Act. FDA receives prompt notice of the issuance of relevant patents, the
filing of ANDAs, and the filing of infringement actions, giving it an early
opportunity to address issues before they get attention from the courts. As
the regulatory gatekeeper to the pharmaceutical marketplace, FDA must ulti-
mately determine when generic entry may begin. So far, FDA has taken its
marching orders in the first instance from the innovators, erring on the side
of deferring generic entry. But it is by no means clear that this is what Con-
gress intended in the Hatch-Waxman Act. We argue below that FDA could
and should take a larger role in determining which patents should defer ge-
neric entry without overstepping the limits of its statutory authorities and
without displacing the role assigned to the courts in the Hatch-Waxman Act
and under the patent laws. But further Congressional action may be neces-
sary to get FDA to exercise regulatory oversight and to provide it with re-
sources to do the job expeditiously.
I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Two statutes dominate the legal environment for new drug development:
the Patent Act22 and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.23 Although
these legal regimes were once separate, Congress yoked them together in
passing the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. Congress attempted to strike a bal-
ance between promoting price-lowering competition in older drugs by en-
couraging generic entry in the market after the expiration of all relevant
patents and promoting innovation in new drug development by deferring
generic entry prior to that time. This Part describes how the Hatch-Waxman
Act adjusted both patent and drug regulation in an effort to balance these
competing goals.
To promote competition, the Hatch-Waxman Act substantially lowered
the regulatory entry barrier for generic versions (generics) of previously ap-
proved products (listed products) by allowing the use of an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA)24 rather than the more costly New Drug
22. Set forth as amended in title 35 of the U.S. Code.
23. Set forth as amended in title 21 of the U.S. Code.
24. The requirements for an ANDA are codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A) (2012).
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Application (NDA) required for a new chemical entity.25 Prior to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, FDA treated generic versions of previously approved products
as new drugs, and therefore required that the sponsor of the generic product
submit full reports of data from clinical trials to make the same showing of
safety and efficacy required for approval of an NDA.26 This regulatory entry
barrier was usually sufficient to defer generic entry long after relevant pat-
ents had expired because the costs of full clinical trials were prohibitive for
generic products that would be sold at competitive prices.27 The Hatch-Wax-
man Act lowered this barrier considerably by allowing approval of an
ANDA based on a much less costly showing that a generic product is “bioe-
quivalent” to a previously approved listed product, without requiring dupli-
cation of safety and efficacy trials.28 The result was a substantial increase in
approvals of generic drugs. But pharmaceutical innovators saw ANDAs as a
form of unfair free-riding that would allow competitors to share in the regu-
latory benefits of valuable proprietary data that the innovators bore the cost
and risk of generating. This free-riding, they argued, would undermine in-
centives for innovation.
25. The requirements for an NDA include submissions of “full reports of investigations
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug
is effective in use.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
26. Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic products were sometimes approved with-
out new trials on the basis of published literature under a “paper NDA.” 45 Fed. Reg. 82,060
(Dec. 12, 1980). Questions about the legality and reach of this mechanism were part of impe-
tus for the Hatch-Waxman Act. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for
Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal
History of U.S. Law and Observations for the Future, 39 IDEA J. L. & TECH. 389–428 (1999).
Although the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”) now provides for approval
of paper NDAs, 21 U.S.C. § 505(b)(2), this approval pathway has until recently been largely
eclipsed by ANDAs. The language of the provision is quite broad, however, and FDA inter-
prets it to allow approval of a drug that is similar but not identical to a previously approved
product based in part on previous unpublished studies that the applicant neither conducted nor
obtained the right to use. Tam Q. Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Ge-
neric Biologics under Existing Law and Proposed Reforms in the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
77–137 (2007).
27. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 187–94 (1999).
28. An ANDA does not require full reports of clinical trials to show safety and efficacy,
so long as the conditions of use, active ingredients, route of administration and strength are the
same as a previously approved “listed product,” the ANDA product is “bioequivalent” to the
listed product, and the labeling of the two products is the same. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). FDA
regulations define bioequivalence as follows:
Bioequivalence means the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent
to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or
pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when ad-
ministered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately de-
signed study. . . .
21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (2014).
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To promote innovation, the Hatch-Waxman Act deferred generic entry
in two ways. First, it amended the Patent Act to give innovators patent term
extensions of up to five years to compensate for some of the time lost while
their products were in clinical trials and awaiting FDA approval.29 Second, it
provided head-start periods following approval of an NDA before a generic
could submit an ANDA30 or before FDA could approve an ANDA,31 some-
times called “data exclusivity” or “regulatory exclusivity.” These regulatory
exclusivity periods function somewhat like patents, in that they defer entry
of competing generic products, but the patent holder need not bring a costly
patent infringement action and take the risk that a court would hold the pat-
ent invalid. FDA enforces these exclusivity periods by deferring the submis-
sion or approval of ANDAs until specified dates, with the effect of keeping
generic products off the market.
The Hatch-Waxman Act also included complex provisions governing
the timing of ANDA approval during the term of certain patents—specifi-
cally, “any patent which claims the drug for which [an NDA is filed] or
which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim
of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed
by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”32 These
provisions give FDA a role as de facto enforcer of certain drug patents by
directing it to look to those patents to determine the timing of ANDA ap-
provals. The provisions offer valuable benefits both for innovators and for
generics, but not all patents have these effects.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012). The period of extension includes one-half of the time spent
in clinical trials and all of the time between submission and approval of the NDA. Id.
§ 156(c)(2). The relevant dates are determined by FDA, and on the basis of those dates the
PTO extends the term of the patent. Astra v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Both periods are reduced by any time attributable to an applicant’s lack of diligence. 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(c)(1). The remaining patent life after extension may not exceed fourteen years beyond
the date of FDA approval. Id. § 156(c)(3). Only the first approval of a new active ingredient
qualifies for a patent term extension, and only one patent may be extended per new active
ingredient. Fisons PLC v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The patent to be extended must
be in force on the date of approval, 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(1), and it must cover either the product,
a method of using the product, or a method of manufacturing the product. Id. § 156(a).
30. No ANDA may be submitted for five years following the first approval of an NDA
for a new chemical entity, except that an ANDA that includes a challenge to validity or in-
fringement of a patent may be submitted after four years, subject to an extended stay of regula-
tory approval if an infringement action is commenced during the following year. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
31. FDA may not approve an ANDA that covers an approved supplement to an NDA
(such as a supplemental approval for a new indication or for a switch from prescription only to
over-the-counter sales) that required further clinical trials for three years from the date of
approval of the supplement. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii), (iv).
32. Id. § 355(b)(1).
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A. The Orange Book
The Hatch-Waxman Act created a system within FDA for tracking those
patents “with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasona-
bly be asserted” against the unauthorized sale of copies of previously ap-
proved products, and for deferring the submission and approval of ANDAs
during the term of those patents. An NDA applicant must disclose in its
NDA the patent number and expiration date of any such patent,33 and must
update this information to include later-issued patents.34 Upon approval of
the NDA, FDA publishes this information in a publication called Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (known as “the
Orange Book”), which FDA updates every thirty days.35
When a generic submits an ANDA, it must include a certification or
statement about the relevance to its ANDA of each patent in the Orange
Book for the previously approved “listed” product. If the patent claims the
drug or a method of use for which the ANDA seeks approval, the ANDA
must include one of three statutory “certifications”: a “paragraph II certifica-
tion” indicating that the patent has expired; a “paragraph III certification”
indicating the date on which the patent will expire; or a “paragraph IV certi-
fication” indicating “that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted.”36 If the patent claims a method of use for which the ANDA does
not seek approval, the ANDA may instead include a “section viii statement”
indicating that the patent “does not claim a use for which the applicant is
seeking approval.”37
The effect of these provisions is to direct FDA to defer ANDA approval
during the term of a relevant patent, but not during the term of an irrelevant
patent. If the patent does not claim a drug or method of use that is covered
by an NDA, or if the patent could not reasonably be asserted against an
unauthorized version of the drug, or if the patent only claims a method of
use for which the ANDA does not seek approval, the patent is not relevant to
approval of the ANDA. If no relevant patents remain in force, the ANDA
may be approved without further delay (assuming it is otherwise approva-
33. Id.
34. Id. § 355(c)(2).
35. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (34th ed. 2014), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm. The Hatch-Waxman Act requires FDA to publish this information
and to update it every thirty days, including newly submitted patent information in the updates.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A).
36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(7)(vii)(2)–(4). If there are no patents for the listed drug in
the Orange Book, the ANDA applicant may use a “paragraph I certification,” indicating that
no patent information has been filed. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(7)(vii)(1).
37. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
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ble).38 If a relevant patent is still in force, the ANDA may be approved upon
the expiration date of that patent.39
B. ANDA Infringement Litigation
Further provisions permit the parties to litigate disputes about patent
validity and infringement in the courts prior to generic entry. Because these
provisions are central to FDA’s view of its role in patent disputes as “purely
ministerial,” and because they have had considerable unintended conse-
quences, we consider them here in some detail. These provisions apply when
an ANDA applicant makes a paragraph IV certification that a relevant patent
is invalid or will not be infringed by the ANDA product. The ANDA appli-
cant must give notice within 20 days to the patent owner and to the holder of
the approved NDA including “a detailed statement of the factual and legal
basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed.”40 The ANDA may then be approved immediately, unless a patent
infringement action is brought within forty-five days.41 The filing of a patent
infringement action triggers an automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval
of the ANDA, which may be adjusted by the court if either party fails to
cooperate in expediting the action.42 To allow litigation of these claims prior
to generic entry, the Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Patent Act to make it
an act of infringement to submit an ANDA “for a drug claimed in a patent or
the use of which is claimed in a patent” for the purpose of obtaining ap-
proval for commercial marketing prior to patent expiration.43 A prevailing
plaintiff—the innovator—may obtain a court order deferring the effective
date of approval of the ANDA until the end of the patent term and an injunc-
tion against commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale by the generic
manufacturer but may not recover damages unless commercial acts have oc-
curred.44 On the other hand, if a court determines that the patent is invalid or
not infringed, approval of the ANDA may be made effective immediately,
even if the 30-month stay has not yet expired.45
These provisions fortify in several ways the exclusionary power of those
patents “with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasona-
38. Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I), (II), 355(j)(5)(B)(i). A section viii statement has no ef-
fect on the date on which ANDA approval may be made effective. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
39. Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III), 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
40. Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). The twenty-day period for giving notice
is measured from “the date of the postmark on the notice with which the Secretary informs the
applicant that the application has been filed.” Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I). If the notice is made as
part of an amendment or supplement to an application, notice must be given at the time of the
amendment or supplement. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)II).
41. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
42. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012).
44. Id. § 271(e)(4).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
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bly be asserted” against an ANDA product. They provide notice to generics
of the existence of relevant patents and require that generics include patent
certifications for each relevant patent in their ANDAs. If a generic asserts
through a paragraph IV certification that a relevant patent is invalid or not
infringed, it must agree to give notice to the patent holder and NDA holder.
If a patent is irrelevant to the ANDA because it covers only methods of use
for which the ANDA does not seek approval, the ANDA must include a
section viii statement to that effect. Unless an ANDA includes a paragraph
IV certification or a section viii statement, FDA will use its regulatory gate-
keeper role to defer the effective date of ANDA approval until the patents
listed in the Orange Book expire, thereby excluding competitors from the
market without the need for infringement litigation. Patent owners need not
monitor the market to spot infringing activity: they can wait for infringers to
step forward and reveal their plans, along with “a detailed statement of the
factual and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is inva-
lid or will not be infringed” that they may consider as they contemplate
whether to bring an infringement action. They may sue for infringement
before commercial activity has begun, giving them an opportunity to secure
injunctive relief before they suffer any loss of revenue from generic entry.
And if they choose to sue, they may secure an automatic thirty-month stay
against generic entry, providing preliminary relief without the usual show-
ing46 required to get a preliminary injunction from a court. These regulatory
consequences—which we call the “Hatch-Waxman boost”—reach beyond
the ordinary remedies that courts award for patent infringement. The Hatch-
Waxman boost uses regulatory consequences to fortify the exclusionary ef-
fects of patents. These advantages may motivate innovators to include in the
Orange Book patents of dubious validity or narrow scope, even if an impar-
tial observer would disagree that “a claim of patent infringement could rea-
sonably be asserted” against a bioequivalent product on the basis of those
patents.
The statute also offers benefits to generics that may encourage them to
use paragraph IV certifications to challenge validity or infringement even
when the merits of the challenge are uncertain. The most valuable of these
benefits is “generic exclusivity,” which gives the first generic to submit an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification a 180-day head start period follow-
ing first commercial marketing of the ANDA product before FDA will ap-
prove another ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for the same drug.47
Because the first generic competitor in the market for a drug typically
charges higher prices and captures a larger market share until a second ge-
neric competitor enters the market, this period of generic exclusivity has
46. See Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
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significant value.48 Even if an applicant does not qualify for generic exclu-
sivity, an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification may be submitted a full
year before an ANDA without such a certification, as early as four years
after approval of the NDA for the listed drug.49 If the innovator does not
bring an infringement action, the ANDA may be approved effective immedi-
ately,50 but if an infringement action is commenced during the fifth year
following approval of the NDA, the thirty-month stay is extended to expire
seven and a half years after approval of the NDA.51 A generic firm might
welcome an opportunity to probe the willingness of a patent holder to liti-
gate validity and infringement at this early stage, prior to market entry and
without having to risk liability for damages if it loses.52 Finally, filing an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification starts the meter ticking on the
thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the ANDA, while precluding (under
2003 amendments) the entry of additional stays based on later patents sub-
mitted after the filing date of the ANDA.53
48. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1998). The value of ge-
neric exclusivity is diminished if multiple ANDA filers share the exclusivity. Multiple ANDA
filers may share the 180-day period of generic exclusivity if each files a complete application
with a paragraph IV certification on the same date and no previously filed ANDA for the same
drug included a paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I), (II)(bb) (2012).
For blockbuster products, such multiple filings are common on the first date that they are
allowed, four years after approval of the NDA. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). See CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY WHEN
MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY, 4 (2003), available at http://www.fda
.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm072851
.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). The value of generic exclusivity may also be diminished if the
NDA holder decides to launch its own competing “authorized generic” during the generic
exclusivity period. An “authorized generic” is a product that is marketed and priced as a ge-
neric but sold under the authority of the holder of the NDA rather than under an ANDA. The
courts have sustained the legality of authorized generics. See Teva Pharma. Indus. Ltd. v.
Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Authorized generics increase competition during
the period of generic exclusivity and thereby reduce prices to consumers, but the long term
effects may be more ambiguous if authorized generics undermine incentives to challenge drug
patents by filing paragraph IV certifications. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENER-
ICS: AN INTERIM REPORT (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P062105author
izedgenericsreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2013). See also JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL33605, AUTHORIZED GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS: EFFECTS ON INNOVATION
(2006), available at http://research.policyarchive.org/2955.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015). The
FTC report on authorized generics estimates that on average, expenditures at wholesale prices
of a generic during the 180-day exclusivity period equal 61% of expenditures on the brand
name product during a comparable period prior to generic entry. Once the generic exclusivity
period expires and more generic competitors enter, price competition is likely to reduce profits
considerably.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).
50. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
51. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
52. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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In short, the rules of the Hatch-Waxman Act alter the exclusionary ef-
fects of patents in ways that are potentially valuable to both innovators and
generics. Each side has reasons to litigate disputes that might appear risky to
an impartial observer. It therefore makes good sense to question the asser-
tions of both innovators and generics as to whether “a claim of patent in-
fringement could reasonably be asserted” against an ANDA product on the
basis of particular patents. Otherwise, these interested parties might impose
unjustified restrictions on competition in purported reliance on irrelevant
patents.
II. PATENT PUNTING AT FDA
From the start, FDA has taken a narrow view of its role in administering
the patent provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, insisting that it has no obli-
gation to police the accuracy or appropriateness of the patent information
submitted to it by innovators or the relevance of particular patents to particu-
lar NDAs or ANDAs.54 FDA has repeatedly engaged in rule-making to inter-
pret the patent provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act to specify the kinds of
patents that are to be disclosed by NDA applicants and to devise administra-
tive mechanisms to implement those provisions, but it has structured its reg-
ulations to keep the agency free of any burden to oversee compliance, or
even to read patents to check if the information submitted is accurate.
Some features of the statutory scheme are consistent with a limited FDA
role in resolving patent disputes under the Hatch-Waxman regime. For ex-
ample, the statutory obligation on innovators to disclose patent information
to FDA mentions only patent numbers and expiration dates,55 without ex-
plicitly requiring that applicants provide FDA with copies of patents or oth-
erwise specify what they cover.56 Nor is the statutory obligation on FDA to
54. Abbreviated New Drug Applications, Proposed Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872 (pro-
posed July 10, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Proposal]; Abbreviated New Drug Application Regula-
tions; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338 (Oct. 3, 1994) [hereinafter 1994
Final] (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314); Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug:
Patent Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated
New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug is Invalid or Will Not be
Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,448 (proposed Oct. 24, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Proposal]; Applica-
tions for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Requirements
and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certi-
fying That a Patent Claiming a Drug is Invalid or Will Not be Infringed, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676
(June 18, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Final] (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (“The applicant shall file with the application the pat-
ent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for the which the
applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug and with
respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not
licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”). But cf. 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.53(b) (2014) (administrative regulation requiring that applicant submit additional infor-
mation for patents claiming polymorphs and methods of use).
56. FDA regulations, however, require more extensive disclosure. See id. § 314.53(b).
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publish patent information explicitly limited to information that is relevant
or accurate.57 If an ANDA includes a paragraph IV certification, the statute
does not include FDA among the parties to whom the applicant must give “a
detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the appli-
cant that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed.”58 The statute specifies
an accelerated time frame for ANDA applicants to give the required notice
(twenty days after FDA informs the applicant that the ANDA has been
filed)59 and for patent holders to respond by bringing infringement actions
(forty-five days after receiving the notice),60 leaving limited time for admin-
istrative review before litigation begins. And if the patent holder decides to
sue the applicant for infringement, the statute directs FDA to stay approval
of the ANDA for thirty months pending litigation of the patent dispute in the
district court,61 while giving the court authority to modify the stay if the
parties are dilatory in pursuing the litigation. These provisions are consistent
with a limited function for FDA as a clearinghouse for patent information,
leaving to the courts any substantive determinations on the merits.62
But the role of the courts is also limited, inviting a larger regulatory role
to fill important gaps in the statutory scheme. The considerable commercial
values at stake in the cascade of regulatory consequences that follow from
listing patents in the Orange Book—what we call the Hatch-Waxman
boost—makes it treacherous to leave firms with unfettered discretion over
patent listing decisions. Determinations of which patents are entitled to the
Hatch-Waxman boost have great economic significance not only to the firms
that file NDAs and ANDAs, but also to patients who need drugs and to those
who pay for their care.
The statute sets a standard that restricts the Hatch-Waxman boost to
certain qualifying patents, specifically:
57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (“Upon approval of the application, the Secretary shall
publish information submitted under the two preceding sentences.”).
58. The language quoted in text appears at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II). The statute
specifies that notice must be given to “each owner of the patent that is the subject of the
certification,” id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I), and to “the holder of the approved application . . . for
the drug that is claimed by the patent or a use of which is claimed by the patent,” id.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(II), but does not require that this notice be given to “the Secretary” or to
FDA, so long as the applicant includes with its ANDA a statement that it will give notice to
the specified parties as required by the statute. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i).
59. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii).
60. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
61. Id. If an infringement action is commenced during the final year of regulatory exclu-
sivity (i.e., between four and five years after approval of the NDA), the 30-month stay shall be
extended to give a total of seven and one-half years between NDA approval and expiration of
the stay. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
62. Indeed, Congress went to some trouble to clarify that the courts could hear these
disputes before market entry by the generics, amending the Patent Act to define the filing of an
ANDA for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent as an act of
patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
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[A]ny patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submit-
ted the application [i.e., the NDA] or which claims a method of
using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent in-
fringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by
the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.63
This standard imposes at least three limitations: (1) the patent must
claim a drug or a method of using a drug;64 (2) the claimed drug or method
of use must be within the scope of the NDA in connection with which the
patent is submitted;65 and (3) the patent must support a reasonable assertion
of infringement against unauthorized manufacture, use or sale of the drug.
Patents that do not meet these criteria should not trigger the Hatch-Waxman
boost.
The statute further limits the Hatch-Waxman boost by relieving ANDA
filers from the obligation to submit a certification for certain listed method
of use patents. An applicant may instead submit a “section viii statement” if
the patent is “a method of use patent which does not claim a method of use
for which the applicant is seeking approval.”66 The use of a section viii state-
ment allows a generic to avoid the requirement to give notice of the basis for
the patent challenge and to avoid the automatic thirty-month stay of approval
of the ANDA. On the other hand, use of a section viii statement does not
allow the generic to claim a right to generic exclusivity. These are signifi-
cant consequences that turn on the relationship between certain patents on
methods of use and the scope of approval sought in an ANDA. Yet nothing
in the Hatch-Waxman Act gives District Courts the opportunity or authority
to determine whether a particular ANDA is entitled to bypass the Hatch-
Waxman boost in this fashion.
As originally enacted, the Hatch-Waxman Act provided no mechanism
for judicial review of the propriety of patent listings at all, leaving only FDA
in a position to withhold the Hatch-Waxman boost from patents that did not
meet the statutory criteria.67 In 2003, Congress amended the statute to allow
an ANDA applicant that has been sued for infringement to “assert a counter-
claim seeking an order requiring the holder [of the NDA] to correct or delete
63. Id. § 355(b)(1). The “application” in this context is the NDA submitted by the inno-
vator for the listed drug.
64. For FDA’s interpretation of this statutory language, see 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)
(2014) (language does not extend to patents on manufacturing processes, packaging, metabo-
lites, and chemical intermediates).
65. FDA reasonably interprets the statute as limiting both patents on the drug and
method of use. Id.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2012).
67. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding
no private cause of action to delist a patent from the Orange Book, and improper listing of a
patent is not a defense to a patent infringement action); Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d
1335, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
214 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 21:197
the patent information submitted by the holder . . . on the ground that the
patent does not claim either—(aa) the drug for which the application was
approved, or (bb) an approved method of using the drug.”68 No damage rem-
edy is available for such a counterclaim, and a counterclaim may only be
asserted if an infringement action is filed.69
This belated provision for a statutory counterclaim does little to address
the problem of improper patent listings. By the time such a counterclaim is
asserted, it is already too late to undo the effects of the Hatch-Waxman
boost. The listing of the patent has already made it necessary for the ANDA
applicant to submit a certification for the patent and to give notice to the
NDA holder and patent holder of the basis for any challenge to validity or
infringement of the patent, the first ANDA with a paragraph IV certification
has already established its entitlement to 180 days of generic exclusivity,
and the thirty-month stay has been triggered. The stay may well have run its
full course by the time a district court orders the NDA holder to correct the
information in the Orange Book.
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act plainly contemplated that the courts
would adjudicate disputes about infringement and validity involving “any
patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the [NDA]
or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not
licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the
drug,”70 there is no reason to think that Congress intended to confer the
Hatch-Waxman boost on patents that do not meet the statutory criteria for
listing in the Orange Book. It is even less plausible that Congress intended to
defer approval of an ANDA based on a method of use patent which does not
claim a method of use for which the ANDA is seeking approval. Congress,
however, failed to provide an explicit mechanism for determining which pat-
ents should trigger the Hatch-Waxman boost, leaving FDA to address this
gap in the regulatory scheme through rulemaking.
A. Rulemaking Without Oversight
FDA has used rulemaking to minimize its ongoing role in administering
the patent provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. At the same time it has
revealed considerable sophistication about how firms have exploited impre-
cision and gaps in the statute and willingness to take liberties with the statu-
tory text. It took FDA a full decade after passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act
68. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173 117 Stat. 2452 [hereinafter MMA 2003] (codified in pertinent part at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I)).
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(II) (2012) (“Subclause (I) does not authorize the
assertion of a claim described in subclause (I) in any civil action or proceeding other than a
counterclaim . . .”).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(G) (2012).
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to promulgate a final rule in 1994 interpreting its patent provisions.71 By
then FDA had become familiar with many strategic moves made by firms
seeking to claim or avoid the Hatch-Waxman boost. The regulations72 set
specific limits on the types of patents to be listed in the Orange Book, calling
for the listing of patents on drug substances, drug products and methods of
use that are the subject of a pending or approved NDA, and explicitly ex-
cluding patents on manufacturing processes,73 packaging, metabolites, and
intermediates.74 Although the statute mentioned only patent number and ex-
piration date, FDA’s regulations further required disclosure of the type of
patent and the identity of the patent owner.75 FDA also required NDA hold-
ers “to notify FDA of the patented uses that appear in the approved labeling
for their products” so that FDA could provide guidance to ANDA filers
about whether to submit a section vii—i.e., a Paragraph II, III, or IV—certi-
fication or a section viii statement.76 The regulations filled other gaps in the
statute that had come to light. For example, they extended the use of para-
graph IV certifications to patents that are unenforceable (as distinguished
from the explicit statutory categories of “invalid” and “not infringed”)77 and
specified that late submissions of patents would be included in the Orange
Book but do not require further certifications from ANDA applicants who
previously submitted a certification for other listed patents.78 In a provision
subsequently struck down by the courts,79 FDA added to the statutory re-
quirements for generic exclusivity a further requirement that the generic
must have successfully defended a patent infringement action.80
In contrast to this active role in interpreting the patent provisions of the
statute, FDA repeatedly and emphatically rejected suggestions that it moni-
tor compliance with these provisions and regulations in individual cases, cit-
ing its lack of patent expertise, lack of resources, and the higher priority it
assigned to other tasks. The following response to a proposal that it establish
a mechanism “for review of submitted patent information to determine, at
71. See 1994 Final, supra note 54.
72. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2014). The regulations were amended in 2003 in re-
sponse to an FTC investigation of abuses. See 2002 Proposal, supra note 54; 2003 Final, supra
note 54.
73. The Hatch-Waxman Act included patents on manufacturing methods in designating
patents eligible for patent term extension. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2012).
74. The original version of these regulations as promulgated in 1994 are set forth at the
end of 1994 Final, supra note 54.
75. 1994 Final, supra note 54, § III.A.25; 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(b), (c).
76. 1994 Final, supra note 54, § III.A.1; 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c).
77. See 1994 Final, supra note 54, § III.A.5; 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50((h)(1)(A)(4),
314.94(a)(12)(i)(A)(4).
78. 1994 Final, supra note 54, § III.A.7; 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(i)(B)(4).
79. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
80. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1). The 1994 version of 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) is set
forth at the end of 1994 Final, supra note 54.
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least on a very general basis, applicability to the particular NDA in question”
is typical:
As stated elsewhere in this final rule, FDA does not have the exper-
tise to review patent information. The agency believes that its scarce
resources would be better utilized in reviewing applications rather
than reviewing patent claims.81
FDA sometimes went so far as to cite its own professed ignorance of
patent law as a canon of interpretation, invoking it as a reason to choose an
interpretation that it could administer without having to understand patent
law over an alternative interpretation that would require patent expertise to
administer. For example, FDA rejected a suggestion that it should limit the
scope of generic exclusivity by deferring only those later-filed ANDAs that
actually benefited from the previous paragraph IV challenge by the firm
holding generic exclusivity. Under this rejected approach, FDA would not
defer approval of an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification that raised a
different infringement issue than was raised in the original challenge, be-
cause in that situation the subsequent ANDA filer was not free-riding on the
efforts of the first challenger. FDA rejected this interpretation of the statute
because it would require FDA to determine whether the two paragraph IV
certifications raised the same or different patent issues:
FDA lacks the expertise in patent law that would allow it to deter-
mine whether a subsequent applicant raised issues of noninfringe-
ment in common with the previous applicant. Therefore, the 180-
day period is available to the applicant who resolves an issue of
patent coverage, regardless of the judgment’s applicability to subse-
quent ANDA applicants.82
Here, FDA prioritized its wish to avoid patent issues over the policy of
limiting generic exclusivity to circumstances that would otherwise present a
free rider problem. Yet this same policy led FDA to take great liberties with
the statutory language in limiting the scope of generic exclusivity when it
did not require FDA to engage with patent issues. As previously noted,83
FDA added a regulatory requirement (subsequently overturned by the
courts) that the challenger must be sued for infringement and successfully
defend the action in order to claim generic exclusivity. FDA justified this
regulatory gloss on the statutory scheme as following from the underlying
rationale of encouraging meritorious patent challenges by protecting suc-
81. 1994 Final, supra note 54, § III.C.22. See also id. §§ III.C.26, III.C.38, III.F.41,
III.G.54, III.G.61.
82. 1989 Proposal, supra note 54, § V.K.2.
83. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
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cessful challengers from competition from free riders.84 But the same ratio-
nale for generic exclusivity would also seem to support limiting generic
exclusivity to defer only those subsequent ANDAs that raise the same in-
fringement issue. After all, ANDAs with patent challenges that do not raise
the same issues are not free-riding on the efforts of the first generic chal-
lenger. FDA was unwilling to consider this argument only because it meant
having to evaluate the relevance of patent infringement litigation to particu-
lar ANDAs. Put differently, patent punting functioned as a canon of interpre-
tation that led FDA to choose some meanings and reject others according to
the resulting burden on FDA to engage with patents.
Sometimes FDA justified its patent punting moves as preserving the
statutory role of the courts in resolving patent disputes. But even for fre-
quently contested matters on which the Hatch-Waxman Act provided no re-
course to the courts, such as whether an ANDA applicant could use a section
viii statement rather than a paragraph IV certification, FDA insisted that
Congress could not possibly have intended for FDA to exercise oversight
given its ignorance of patents:
FDA’s experience implementing the patent certification provisions
suggests that where the patent owner and generic applicant disagree
as to the applicability of a use patent, the patent owner may seek to
have FDA intervene, by alleging that the generic applicant has not
complied with the patent certification and notification provisions of
the act. Because FDA has no expertise in the field of patents, the
agency has no basis for determining whether a use patent covers the
use sought by the generic applicant. Nor does FDA believe that
Congress intended the patent provisions of Title I of the 1984
Amendments to require the agency to make such determinations.
On the contrary, the 1984 Amendments are plainly structured to al-
low any patent disputes to be litigated in federal court.85
This analysis of Congressional intent ignores significant features of the
statute. The only patent disputes that the Hatch-Waxman Act directed to the
courts were patent infringement actions based on the filing of an ANDA.
Congress did nothing to provide for litigation of disputes about the applica-
bility of particular use patents to particular ANDAs. Indeed, quite the con-
trary, by allowing section viii statements rather than paragraph IV
certifications for irrelevant method of use patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act
seems if anything to divert these disputes away from litigation. If an ANDA
applicant may use a section viii statement to avoid a method of use patent, it
need not include a paragraph IV certification for that patent nor give notice
84. 1994 Final, supra note 54, §§ III.I.72, III.I.76.
85. 1989 Final, supra note 54, § III.Q.3.
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of the basis for its argument that the patent is invalid or not infringed.86 The
patent will not cause FDA to enter a thirty-month stay against approval of
the ANDA, and the section viii statement will not provide a basis for an
award of generic exclusivity. If Congress intended for the courts to resolve
disputes about whether particular method of use patents should trigger these
consequences, they might have extended to section viii statements the same
provisions that promote patent infringement litigation following paragraph
IV certifications.
The boundaries that FDA sets on its role in administering the patent
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act cannot be fully explained as a matter
of necessary inference from the structure of the statute. A more plausible
explanation is its own preference to avoid engaging the merits of any dispute
involving patents. Either way, its bottom line has been consistent and clear:
FDA will not read patents.
B. Deference to Innovators
If FDA is unwilling to provide administrative oversight, and if judicial
review is unavailable (or untimely), who determines which patents get the
Hatch-Waxman boost? For the most part FDA defers to the innovators that
submit the patent information. If FDA receives a complaint that a patent is
improperly listed, it forwards it to the NDA holder and asks if they want to
make any changes:
[I]f an applicant disputes the accuracy or relevance of patent infor-
mation, it should first notify FDA in writing and state the reasons
for the disagreement. FDA will then request that the relevant NDA
holder confirm the validity of the patent information, but will not
change the patent information itself unless the NDA holder with-
draws or amends the patent information. The agency believes that
these procedures for determining the validity of patent information
are sufficient.87
The insufficiency of these procedures soon became manifest as firms
took advantage of the lack of administrative oversight to gain the Hatch-
86. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676–77 (2012).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)–(viii) (2012).
87. 1994 Final, supra note 54, § III.I.64; 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (2014). FDA has re-
cently proposed a modest change in this rule that would allow it instead to defer to the ANDA
applicant’s interpretation of the scope of the patent if the NDA holder “fails to timely respond
to FDA’s request . . . or submits a revision to the use code that does not provide adequate
clarity for FDA to determine whether [a section viii statement] would be appropriate based on
the NDA holder’s use code and approved labeling.” Abbreviated New Drug Applications and
505(b)(2) Applications; Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 6802, 6827–28 (Feb. 6, 2015) [hereinaf-
ter 2015 Proposed]. See infra notes 146–56 and accompanying text.
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Waxman boost for dubious patent listings.88 Frustrated ANDA applicants
were unable to persuade the courts to compel FDA or NDA holders to re-
move improperly listed patents from the Orange Book. One obstacle was a
pre-Hatch-Waxman provision in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
that limits enforcement to proceedings “by and in the name of the United
States.”89 The Federal Circuit relied on this provision in Mylan
Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson to reject a private action brought by an
ANDA applicant against an innovator and FDA to compel “delisting” of a
patent added to the Orange Book eleven hours before an ANDA was to
become effective.90 The Federal Circuit concluded that the action was in
essence an impermissible attempt to assert a private right of action for delist-
ing a patent under the FDCA.91
ANDA applicants had no more success suing FDA under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act92 to compel it to delist patents that do not satisfy the
requirements for listing.93 The Federal Circuit in Apotex v. Thompson94 and
the Fourth Circuit in aaiPharma v. Thompson95 both concluded that the text
of the Hatch-Waxman Act leaves it unclear whether Congress intended for
FDA to review patents proffered for listing in the Orange Book,96 and that
FDA’s interpretation of the ambiguous statute was entitled to deference.97
Both courts, however, noted that FDA’s interpretation left an enforcement
gap that Congress or FDA might wish to close.98 In a concurring opinion in
Apotex v. Thompson, Judge Plager observed that FDA’s practice was a
88. Some of these controversies are reviewed in JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT LAW 327–47 (2d ed. 2010). See also Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation
and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 417 (2011).
89. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012). Some provisions may also be enforced by the states. Id.
§ 337(b).
90. 268 F.3d 1323, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit reversed a District
Court decision granting a preliminary injunction against the innovator in a declaratory judg-
ment action based on its assessment that the ANDA applicant was likely to succeed in proving
that the patent (which covered a metabolite of the drug) was not properly listed in the Orange
Book because it did not claim the approved drug or a method of using the approved drug. 139
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
91. 268 F.3d at 1330–32.
92. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2012).
93. Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
94. Id. at 1348.
95. 296 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2002). The facts of aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson are
unusual in that the plaintiff, aaiPharma, was not an ANDA applicant seeking to delist an
improperly listed patent, but rather a patent holder complaining that the NDA holder, Lilly,
refused to submit its patent for listing. The court noted that it was unclear why aaiPharma,
which did not have its own product ready for market, was interested in securing a 30-month
stay, id. at 233 n.3, nor why Lilly, which might benefit from the stay, refused to list
aaiPharma’s patent. Id. at 234 n.4.
96. aaiPharma, 296 F.2d at 238; Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1348.
97. 347 F.3d at 1349.
98. 296 F.3d at 242–43.
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“poorly conceived administration of the laws.”99 Judge Plager thought it rea-
sonable to expect FDA to “have on its staff a handful of competent patent
analysts, who, at a minimum, could make an initial judgment about the pro-
priety of a listing,” and concluded, “[i]f neither the Administration nor the
courts see fit to make clear FDA’s obligation to administer the Act in a
responsible way, Congress should consider doing so.”100
C. FTC Investigation and FDA Response
FDA’s refusal to take a larger role in administering the patent provisions
of the Hatch-Waxman Act enabled firms to claim the Hatch-Waxman boost
for their patents free of effective oversight. In a 2002 report, FTC made a
number of recommendations to address anticompetitive abuses of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.101 Several recommendations specifically addressed improper
listing of patents in the Orange Book. The report recommended that only one
thirty-month stay be allowed per ANDA, that the requirements for listing
patents in the Orange Book should be clarified, and that generics should be
able to challenge patent listings in counterclaims to infringement actions.
The FTC followed up with a Citizen Petition102 to FDA asking it to clarify
Orange Book listing requirements.103 FDA responded by amending its regu-
lations104 to limit the kinds of patents that could be listed in the Orange
Book105 and to limit an NDA holder to a single opportunity for a thirty-
month stay against an ANDA.106 But FDA held firm in its refusal to create
99. 347 F.3d at 1353 (Plager, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1353–54.
101. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY (2002).
102. FDA regulations permit any person to submit a citizen petition to FDA asking the
Commissioner to issue, amend, or revoke any order or to take or refrain from taking any other
form of administrative action. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30.
103. FTC Staff’s Citizen Petition on the Listability of Certain Patents in the Orange Book
(May 16, 2001), set forth in Appendix F to FTC Study, id. at 108.
104. See 2002 Proposal, supra note 54; 2003 Final, supra note 54.
105. The revised regulations specify that patents claiming packaging, metabolites, and
intermediates do not qualify for listing in the Orange Book and may not be submitted, but that
patents with “product by process” claims on a drug substance (i.e., product claims that define
the patented product by reciting the process used to create that product) and patents “that claim
a drug substance that is the same as the active ingredient that is the subject of the [NDA]” are
properly listed. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,678–79; 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1)–(2) (2014).
In the case of patents on polymorphs of an approved drug that the NDA holder asserts are “the
same as the active ingredient that is the subject of the [NDA],” FDA requires that the applicant
certify that it has test data “demonstrating that a drug product containing the polymorph will
perform the same as the drug product described in the new drug application,” 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.53(b)(1), but the rule does not require submission of the test data to FDA.
106. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,688–94; 2002 Proposal, supra note 54, at
65,454–56. This interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman provisions was superseded by amend-
ments enacted as part of MMA 2003, supra note 68, that achieve a similar effect by limiting
the 30-month stay to patents that were submitted to FDA prior to the date on which a substan-
tially complete ANDA was submitted. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
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an administrative process to challenge patent listings or to remove improp-
erly listed patents from the Orange Book.
Rather than taking administrative responsibility for monitoring patent
submissions, FDA sought to bring about voluntary compliance by requiring
that patent submissions be accompanied by detailed “declaration forms” ad-
dressing specific questions about the patent claims and attesting to the accu-
racy of the submitted information under penalty of perjury.107 The FDA
forms warn that a willfully and knowingly false statement is a criminal of-
fense. For method of use patents, submitters must identify specific patent
claims that relate to specific sections of the drug label corresponding to the
claimed method of use.108 FDA also added a requirement for applicants to
include on the form a description of the method of use in 240 characters or
less that would serve as a “use code” for publication in the Orange Book.
FDA relies on use codes rather than reading patents to determine whether a
method of use patent is relevant to a particular ANDA. If the use code
drafted by the NDA holder suggests that the patent covers a method of use
for which the ANDA seeks approval, then the applicant must submit a sec-
tion vii certification for the patent, triggering the Hatch-Waxman boost.109 If
the use code indicates that the patent is not relevant to a particular ANDA,
the ANDA applicant may avoid the Hatch-Waxman boost by instead submit-
ting a section viii statement that the patent “does not claim a use for which
the applicant is seeking approval” in the ANDA,110 and the ANDA may be
approved without delay.
Assigning the task of drafting use code descriptions to NDA holders
introduced new opportunities for strategic behavior and represented a further
retreat from oversight of the Orange Book on the part of FDA. FDA had
previously drafted use code descriptions itself on the basis of information
submitted by NDA applicants.111 But in 2003, FDA concluded that it was
“most consistent with the general balance adopted in Hatch-Waxman” to
leave it to innovators to characterize the scope of their patent rights, subject
to resolution of infringement disputes in the courts.112 This new form of pat-
ent punting by FDA allowed patent holders to paraphrase their claims so as
to maximize the Hatch-Waxman boost.
FDA rejected calls for an administrative process for challenging patent
listings, noting that courts had upheld its determination that its role with
107. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36, 685–86; 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2014). The current
forms are available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/
Forms/UCM048345.pdf and http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuals
Forms/Forms/UCM048352.pdf.
108. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(i)(O)(1)–(2) (2014).
109. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
110. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,682–85; 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)(2)(i)(O) (2014).
111. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,683.
112. Id. at 36,682.
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respect to patent listings is ministerial,113 and insisted that “it would be inap-
propriate and impractical for us to create regulatory mechanisms for review-
ing patent listings” because “[w]e lack both the resources and the expertise
to resolve such matters.”114 FDA worried that if it took a larger role, its
“decisions on patent listing matters would inevitably lead to disputes and
increased litigation against us,” with no assurance that ANDAs would be
approved sooner.115
D. The Inadequate Counterclaim Remedy
Shortly after FDA came out with its 2003 Final Rule, Congress
amended the Hatch-Waxman provisions as part of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003116 to address
past abuses highlighted in the FTC report.117 The MMA provided that an
ANDA applicant sued for patent infringement “may assert a counterclaim
seeking an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the patent informa-
tion [in the Orange Book] on the ground that the patent does not claim ei-
ther—(aa) the drug for which the application was approved; or (bb) an
approved method of using the drug.”118 As soon became apparent, this lim-
ited counterclaim remedy was inadequate to correct the problems created by
FDA’s failure to exercise timely oversight of patent listings.
This provision has not been extensively used, perhaps because it does
not offer effective relief against the harm caused by inappropriate patent
listings. A counterclaim is only available to an infringement defendant that
has already been sued, providing no help to an ANDA submitter who would
prefer to avoid triggering litigation by submitting a section viii statement
(that the patent is irrelevant) rather than a paragraph IV certification (that the
patent is invalid or not infringed). Moreover, the only remedy available for
the counterclaim—a court order119 to correct the information in the Orange
113. Id. at 36,683.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. MMA 2003, supra note 68.
117. For a review and analysis of these statutory changes and a comparison to FDA’s
regulatory approach, see Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition:
The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417,
432–45 (2011). The most significant legislative changes limited the availability of a 30-month
stay to those patents listed in the Orange Book before submission of a substantially complete
ANDA, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012); the addition of forfeiture provisions that would
cause an ANDA applicant to forfeit its right to claim 180-day exclusivity upon the occurrence
of one of a list of “forfeiture events,” id. § 355(j)(5)(D); provisions for filing declaratory judg-
ment actions and counterclaims to correct or delete patent information submitted to FDA, id.
§ 355(j)(5)(C); and a requirement that certain patent settlement agreements be filed with the
Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission, MMA 2003, supra note 68,
§ 1112(a)(1).
118. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(c)(ii) (2012).
119. The statute explicitly prohibits a damage award. Id. § 355(j)(5)(c)(iii).
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Book—cannot undo the harm to an ANDA filer who asserts that the patent
should not have triggered the Hatch-Waxman boost in the first place.120 Prior
to 2012, some infringement defendants may also have been deterred from
using the counterclaim by a restrictive reading of its terms by the Federal
Circuit in Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories,121 later re-
versed by the Supreme Court.
The facts of Novo Nordisk v. Caraco illustrate how little the courts can
do to correct a problem arising from patent punting by FDA in the face of an
NDA holder’s strategic behavior. Novo Nordisk held an approved NDA on
the drug repaglanide, authorizing it to market the drug for use in three differ-
ent ways: (1) repaglanide monotherapy (i.e., repaglinide alone); (2) repagli-
nide in combination with metformin; and (3) repaglinide in combination
with thiazolidinediones. Novo Nordisk had a method of use patent (the ‘358
patent)122 that claimed:
a method for treating non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus
(NIDDM) comprising administering to a patient in need of such
treatment repaglinide in combination with metformin.123
When it submitted the ‘358 patent for listing in the Orange Book, Novo
Nordisk provided the following straightforward use code narrative on the
FDA form:
Use of repaglinide in combination with metformin to lower blood
glucose.
Caraco initially included a paragraph IV certification for the ‘358 patent
in its ANDA for repaglinide in 2005, and Novo Nordisk sued Caraco for
infringement. Following a suggestion from FDA, Caraco later amended its
ANDA to submit a section viii statement declaring that it did not seek ap-
proval for the use of repaglinide in combination with metformin.124 Novo
Nordisk then changed its use code narrative for the patent to the following
broader language, which greatly exceeded the scope of the actual claim:
A method for improving glycemic control in adults with type 2 dia-
betes mellitus.
120. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
121. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 656 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. Mich.
2009), rev’d, 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Caraco v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S.
Ct. 1670 (2012).
122. U.S. Patent No. 6,677,358 (filed Dec. 13, 1999).
123. Id. col. 10, l. 35. The ‘358 Patent also included product claims to a combination of
repaglinide and metformin.
124. Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d 1367, 1379 n. 16 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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In light of this change, FDA disallowed Caraco’s section viii statement,
because the revised use code obscured the fact that the patent was limited to
a use (replaglinide in combination with metformin) for which the ANDA did
not seek approval. Having previously suggested (on the basis of the prior use
code narrative) that Caraco could use a section viii statement, FDA was
surely aware of the possibility that the broadened use code narrative misrep-
resented the claims of the underlying patent, in violation of its regulations.125
But FDA would not police compliance with its own patent regulations and
would not read the patent claims. Instead, it simply deferred to the NDA
holder’s characterization of what its patent covers.126
Unable to get relief from FDA, Caraco filed a counterclaim to compel
Novo Nordisk to change back to the original use code. The District Court
found that the revised use code narrative “seriously misrepresents the ap-
proved method of use covered by [the patent claim]”127 and concluded that
Caraco was entitled to an order requiring Novo to correct the patent informa-
tion it had submitted to FDA.128 A divided Federal Circuit panel reversed.129
The panel majority held that the statutory counterclaim is available only if
the patent fails to claim either the drug or any approved method of using the
drug, and therefore provided no remedy against listing the ‘358 patent.130
The majority also held that the only “patent information” that may be de-
leted or corrected by counterclaim is the “patent number and expiration
date” that the statute explicitly requires NDA holders to disclose,131 not the
use code narratives that FDA regulations require.132
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed on both grounds, interpreting the
statute to permit a counterclaim for correction of an overly broad use
code.133 This interpretation allows the courts to order correction of listings,
but judicial attention will likely come too late to correct the damage that
could have been averted through timely FDA oversight. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Sotomayor lamented that the statutory counterclaim was an
125. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2014) (“The applicant shall separately identify each pend-
ing or approved method of use and related patent claim. For approved applications, the appli-
cant submitting the method-of-use patent shall identify with specificity the section of the
approved labeling that corresponds to the method of use claimed by the patent submitted.”).
126. Id. § 314.53(f).
127. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 656 F. Supp. 2d 729, 730 (E.D.
Mich. 2009).
128. Id.
129. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(Rader, J., majority opinion); 601 F.3d at 1367 (Clevenger, J., concurring); 601 F.3d at 1368
(Dyk, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1364–66. The majority thought that an infringement defendant that does not
seek approval for the patented use can assert as much in a paragraph IV certification and prove
it in an infringement action. Id. at 1365.
131. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G) (2012).
132. Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d at 1366–67.
133. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012).
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imperfect solution to the problem created by the overly broad use code, re-
quiring expensive and time-consuming litigation, and called upon Congress
or FDA to come up with a better solution.134 The majority observed in a
footnote that the propriety of “FDA’s view of its ministerial role” was not
before it,135 leaving open the possibility of requiring FDA to take a more
active role in the future.
The use code system that allowed Novo Nordisk to misrepresent the
scope of its patent claims to defer generic competition is not required by the
Hatch-Waxman Act, but rather is an administrative innovation designed by
FDA to spare itself from having to read patent claims to determine what they
cover. As FDA explained in the Preamble to its 2003 rule changes, use codes
are designed to clarify “whether an ANDA applicant can ‘carve out’ the
method of use [i.e., use a section viii statement] rather than certify to the
listed patent.”136 The statute requires an ANDA to include a certification
only “with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug . . . or which
claims a use for such listed drug for which the applicant is seeking ap-
proval.”137 If a listed patent only claims a use for which the applicant is not
seeking approval, the applicant may say so in a section viii statement,138
without triggering the Hatch-Waxman boost.139
This is a crucial distinction. When an ANDA includes a paragraph IV
certification, the Hatch-Waxman Act diverts disputes about validity and in-
fringement to litigation.140 But when FDA implemented the use code system,
nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act diverted disputes about the proper use of
a section viii statement to the courts for litigation, and it is unlikely that the
courts would have recognized such a claim.141 A patent holder could sue an
ANDA applicant who has used a section viii statement for patent infringe-
ment (although it would lose on the merits if the patent in fact does not claim
134. Id. at 1688–89 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1677 n.2.
136. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,682.
137. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012) (emphasis added).
138. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
139. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,682.
140. FDA relies on these provisions to support its position that the Hatch-Waxman Act
does not contemplate anything beyond a “ministerial” role for FDA with respect to patents.
See, e.g., 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,683 (“A fundamental assumption of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments is that the courts are the appropriate mechanism for the resolution of
disputes about the scope and validity of patents. The courts have the experience, expertise, and
authority to address complex and important issues of patent law.”).
141. Prior to the 2003 amendments, courts repeatedly held that neither the FFDCA nor
the Patent Act provides a private cause of action for delisting patents from the Orange Book,
see supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text. But in one particularly egregious case an
ANDA applicant brought a successful claim against FDA under the Administrative Procedure
Act alleging that FDA’s refusal to accept a section viii statement rather than a paragraph IV
certification was “arbitrary and capricious.” Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877,
883–84 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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a use for which the ANDA seeks approval).142 But such an infringement
action would not give the courts an occasion to address whether the parties
were entitled to the Hatch-Waxman boost. The statute makes these benefits
(notice, thirty-month stay, generic exclusivity) available without the need for
judicial action, but only when an ANDA includes a paragraph IV certifica-
tion that the patent is invalid or not infringed. And the statute requires such a
certification only “with respect to each patent which claims the listed
drug . . . or which claims a use for such listed drug for which the applicant is
seeking approval” in the ANDA.143 If FDA allows a patent holder to claim
the Hatch-Waxman boost for a patent that is not entitled to those benefits,
there is little that courts can do to fix the problem by the time it gets to their
attention. Only FDA can exercise effective oversight.
In 2015, twelve years after passage of the MMA, FDA published a pro-
posed rule to revise its ANDA regulations once again.144 The proposed rule
continues to exempt FDA from any obligation to read submitted patents to
determine what they claim. But FDA also took note of the Supreme Court’s
observation in Caraco that “an overbroad use code . . . throws a wrench into
the FDA’s ability to approve generic drugs as the statute contemplates.”145
To address this problem, the 2015 Proposed Rule would make several
changes. First, it would “codify our longstanding requirement that the NDA
applicant’s [use code] . . . must contain adequate information to assist FDA
and . . . ANDA applicants in determining whether [the patent] claims a use
for which the . . . ANDA applicant is not seeking approval.”146 In particular,
it would require that if the patent claim does not cover every use of the drug,
“the applicant must only identify the specific portion(s) of the indication or
other condition of use claimed by the patent.”147 Second, in the event that a
third party disputes the accuracy or relevance of the submitted patent infor-
mation, the proposed rule would give the NDA holder thirty days to confirm
the correctness of the patent information and to provide information on the
specific approved use claimed by the patent that enables FDA to make a
determination of whether the patent may be avoided through use of a section
142. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), added as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, submit-
ting an ANDA “for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent”
counts as an act of infringement. The Federal Circuit has clarified that submission of an
ANDA that does not seek approval for the patented use does not count as an act of infringe-
ment under this provision. Bayer Schering Pharma. AG v. Lupin, 676 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Astrazeneca Pharma. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
143. See, e.g., Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (NDA
holder listed a patent in the Orange Book for an unapproved method of use of listed drug; two
competing generics submitted ANDAs, one with a paragraph IV certification for that patent
and the other with a section viii statement for the same patent).
144. See 2015 Proposed, supra note 87.
145. Id. at 6820–21, citing Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1684.
146. Id. at 6820.
147. Id. See text of proposed § 314.53(c)(2)(i)(O)(2) and § 314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(2), id. at
6882–84.
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viii statement.148 Third, and potentially the most significant of the proposed
changes, if the NDA holder either fails to submit a timely response or re-
sponds in a way that fails to provides adequate clarity for FDA to determine
whether a section viii statement is appropriate, FDA would review the
ANDA with deference to the ANDA applicant’s interpretation of the scope
of the patent.149 This represents a marked turnaround from FDA’s current
policy of deference to NDA holders.150 In 2002, when it proposed the current
version of the rule, FDA rejected the possibility of deference to ANDA ap-
plicants in the belief that they could not resist the temptation to cheat:
If ANDA . . . applicants could always avoid the possibility of a 30-
month stay by asserting in a section viii statement that certain label-
ing for which the applicant is seeking approval is not protected by a
listed method-of-use patent—despite the NDA holder’s assertion to
the contrary—there would be little reason for any applicant to sub-
mit a paragraph IV certification for a method-of-use patent. This
approach would essentially eliminate the certification, notice, and
litigation process as to any listed method-of-use patent, producing
an outcome that is inconsistent with the [Hatch-Waxman] act.151
In justifying its 2015 proposal, FDA tells a very different story in which
an ANDA applicant “has a strong incentive to interpret the scope of the
patent correctly to avoid being subject to patent infringement litigation fol-
lowing ANDA approval and potentially enjoined from marketing its prod-
uct.”152 ANDA applicants have another reason to avoid improper use of
section viii statements in lieu of paragraph IV certifications: generic exclu-
sivity is only available for an ANDA that includes a paragraph IV certifica-
tion.153 Perhaps FDA also recognizes that NDA holders have a strong
incentive to submit broad use codes in order to trigger the Hatch-Waxman
boost, as suggested by the reference to the Caraco case in the Proposed
Rule.
The proposed shift from deference to NDA holders to deference to
ANDA applicants will surely provoke opposition from NDA holders and
may not be implemented. FDA suggests that NDA holders can make defer-
ence to ANDA holders unnecessary by avoiding the use of overbroad use
codes:
FDA believes that enhancing the mechanism for challenging over-
broad use codes listed in the Orange Book may cause NDA holders
148. Id. at 6827; text of proposed § 314.53(f)(1), id. at 6885.
149. Id. at 6827.
150. 2003 Final, supra note 54, at 36,682.
151. Id.
152. 2015 Proposed, supra note 87, at 6828.
153. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
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to be more circumspect in their original submission of patent infor-
mation to FDA. Accordingly, we expect that there will rarely be a
need for the Agency to review the proposed labeling for the . . .
ANDA with deference to the . . . ANDA applicant’s interpretation
of the scope of the patent. However, we invite comment on this
proposed approach to enhancing FDA’s response to challenges to
the accuracy or relevance of submissions of patent information to
the Agency, while maintaining the Agency’s ministerial role in pat-
ent filing.154
In other words, FDA is open to considering any approach that does not
require it to read patents. But so long as FDA is unwilling to read patent
claims to determine their relevance to NDAs and ANDAs, whichever default
rule it chooses will empower one side or the other to take advantage of
FDA’s deference. In 2002 and 2015, FDA made different proposals based on
its belief about which party had a better incentive to characterize the cover-
age of the patent accurately. Given FDA’s own interest in maintaining its
“purely ministerial role” in patent matters, it is surely tempted to underesti-
mate the likely errors from a rule of deference, whichever side it defers to.
Another factor to consider in picking a rule of deference is which ap-
proach makes it easier to correct the inevitable errors. The errors arising
from deference to overly broad use codes are effectively uncorrectable. Even
though the Supreme Court eventually interpreted the 2003 statutory counter-
claim provision to permit judicial orders to correct use codes, it provides a
limited remedy that comes too late to undo the effects of the Hatch-Waxman
boost. On the other hand, errors arising from deference to improper use of
section viii statements can be corrected in patent infringement litigation
against the ANDA applicant.155 If the patent holder is correct that the ANDA
seeks approval for a patented use of the drug, the courts have jurisdiction to
resolve the matter.156 The proposed change may thus reduce the incidence of
irremediable harms in comparison to the current rule. But FDA could do a
better job of distinguishing which patents are relevant to which NDAs and
ANDAs if it were willing to read the patents itself instead of deferring to the
assessments of interested parties.
III. SETTLEMENTS AND PATENT PUNTING BY
ANTITRUST COURTS
Many litigated cases never reach adjudication on the merits and are in-
stead resolved by settlements on terms that defer competition. Some of these
cases have provoked scrutiny under antitrust laws, presenting antitrust courts
154. 2015 Proposed, supra note 87, at 6828.
155. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
156. See infra notes 261–271 and accompanying text.
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with the question of whether and how far the patent rights at stake in the
litigation protect the parties from antitrust liability for settling the dispute.
These antitrust cases could provide another opportunity to consider whether
the settlement reflects a fair compromise of the underlying patent dispute,
but instead they have become another arena for patent punting.
A. Incentives for Collusive Settlements
Pharmaceutical firms quickly realized that patent infringement litigation
against the backdrop of the Hatch-Waxman boost did not have to be a zero-
sum game. Rather than pursuing costly and risky litigation to final judgment
for one side or the other, the innovator and generic firms could settle and
split the rents. The terms of these settlements have differed from case to
case—and may be increasingly variable as a result of recent antitrust devel-
opments—but in a recurring pattern the generic gives up its challenge to the
patent and agrees to defer pursuit of its ANDA, perhaps until the end of the
patent term, in exchange for a payment from the innovator to the generic.
These arrangements, sometimes called “reverse payment” or “pay-for-
delay” agreements,157 have drawn extensive antitrust scrutiny, as detailed in
the next Part. It is not difficult to understand why such settlements would be
of interest to antitrust enforcers. If, but for the settlement, the defendant
would have entered the market in competition with the plaintiff, a payment
by a market incumbent to keep a potential entrant off the market looks like
ordinary collusion to avoid competition. But the existence of patents compli-
cates the story, because the patent holder is asserting a legal right to exclude
competitors from the market in the infringement action. If the patent is valid,
and if the generic product would infringe, the patent holder has a right to
exclude the generic until the patent expires. On the other hand, if the patent
is invalid, or if the generic product would not infringe the patent, the patent
holder should lose the infringement action. Uncertainty about how these is-
157. A sampling of the voluminous literature on patent settlements includes Joseph F.
Brodley and Maureen A. O’Rourke, Preliminary Views: Patent Settlement Agreements, 16
ANTITRUST 53 (2002); Jeremy I. Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, (Stanford
Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 1804, 2003), available at http://www.gsb.stanford
.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/gaming-pharmaceutical-patents; Thomas F. Cotter, Re-
fining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Re-
verse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1789
(2003); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Anti-
trust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2002); C. Scott Hemphill, Pay-
ing for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1553 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Prop-
erty Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003); Jonathon M. Lace, Responding to Patent Litiga-
tion Settlements: Does the FTC Have it Right Yet?, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 201 (2002); James
Langenfeld & Wenquing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes:
The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug Manufac-
turers, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 777 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34
RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003).
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sues will be resolved may lead risk-averse parties to settle the litigation—on
terms that are likely to include a reverse payment—even if both sides think
the patent holder is likely to prevail.
Consider a simplified example. Suppose an innovator has brought a pat-
ent infringement suit against a generic that is the first applicant to file an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for that product. If the innovator
prevails in the lawsuit and gets an injunction against generic entry, it will
remain the sole source of the drug and can continue to sell at a monopoly
price. Let’s say that is worth $1 billion to the innovator. On the other hand,
if the generic prevails, it could enter the market right away,158 and FDA
could not approve another ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for the
same product for 180 days.159 After that period expires, other generics could
be approved right away, and the drug would promptly become available at
competitive prices. Let’s say that the generic challenger assesses the value to
it of a complete victory, including the 180-day period of generic exclusivity,
at $100 million. No money will change hands if the case is litigated to final
judgment no matter who wins. There is no infringing product on the market,
so the innovator cannot recover damages even if it proves that the ANDA
product would infringe the patent.160 What is at stake is injunctive relief and
the timing of FDA approval of ANDAs.161 The parties are unsure what the
courts will do, and they are risk averse, so they want to settle.
Suppose the plaintiff has a strong legal case on the merits, and both
parties assess the likelihood of a win by the innovator at 80% and the likeli-
hood of a win by the generic at 20%. Even for such a strong case, one would
expect risk-averse parties to be willing to compromise and settle on terms
that leave each of them somewhat less happy than they would be with a total
victory. Given that the innovator has much more at stake financially than the
generic, one might expect the bargain to favor the generic if it plays its hand
well. If the parties settle for the expected value of the lawsuit to the generic,
one would see a reverse payment of $20 million (20% of $100 million); but
the innovator might be willing to pay as much as $200 million to avoid a
20% risk of losing $1 billion. What figure they settle on depends on relative
risk aversion and bargaining skills, but a reverse payment is to be expected
158. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2012) (“if before the expiration of [the 30-month
stay entered upon filing of an infringement action against the ANDA filer] the district court
decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed . . . the approval shall be made effective on –
(aa) the date on which the court enters judgment reflecting the decision”).
159. Id.
160. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C) (2012) (“damages or other monetary relief may be
awarded against an infringer only if there has been commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell,
or sale within the United States or importation into the United States of an approved drug”).
161. Id. § 271(e)(4)(B) (“injunctive relief may be granted against an infringer to prevent
the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United States or importation
into the United States of an approved drug”).
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in any case. This is not because the patent case is weak, but because the
patent is valuable.
Nonetheless, antitrust litigation, sometimes initiated by private plaintiffs
and sometimes by FTC, followed quickly on the heels of the reverse pay-
ments. Antitrust plaintiffs have seen the reverse payment from the patent
holder to the alleged wrongdoer as a smoking gun that calls into question the
merits of the asserted patent rights, arguing that the underlying infringement
claims must have been frivolous and that the purported settlements are a thin
camouflage for improper collusion to delay competition by sharing the rents
from invalid patents.
B. The Response of Antitrust Courts
Antitrust courts quickly fell into a circuit split, with some applying a per
se rule of illegality for reverse payment agreements and others applying a
form of rule of reason analysis that approached per se legality. In no case,
however, did the court inquire into the merits of the underlying patent in-
fringement case. Like FDA, courts punted on the substantive patent issues.
Indeed, patent punting was the one point on which all courts agreed.
The Sixth Circuit spoke first, finding reverse payments per se illegal in
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.162 That case grew out of a patent
infringement action brought by Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., the manufac-
turer of the branded heart medication Cardizem CD, against Andrx
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a generic firm that had filed an ANDA seeking ap-
proval for a generic version of the drug. The parties reached a settlement
pendent lite in which Andrx agreed not to market its generic version of
Cardizem CD pending a final adjudication in the infringement action, and
not to waive any of its rights under the Hatch-Waxman Act to a period of
generic exclusivity for filing the first ANDA for the product that included a
paragraph IV certification challenging the patent.163 In return, Hoechst
agreed to make periodic payments to Andrx while the lawsuit remained
pending and to grant it licensing rights in the future. The Sixth Circuit saw
the arrangement as “a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the
market” and “a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”164 It
pointed to the reverse payment and the agreement to retain generic exclusiv-
ity in rejecting the argument that the agreement was merely an attempt to
162. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
163. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). Under the version of the statute in effect at the time,
FDA could not approve another ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for the same product
until 180 days after the earlier of the date of first commercial marketing of the generic drug or
the date of a court ruling that the patent is invalid or not infringed. See Kelly, supra note 117,
at 430–32.
164. In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.
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enforce patent rights or to settle patent litigation, noting that Hoechst paid its
“only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”165
Shortly thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit called for “rule of reason” analy-
sis in a case involving similar facts, Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuti-
cals.166 Abbott Laboratories had filed patent infringement lawsuits against
two companies that submitted ANDAs seeking FDA approval to market ge-
neric versions of Abbott’s drug Hytrin. Under the terms of settlement agree-
ments, each defendant agreed not to begin marketing a generic version of
Hytrin until another party did so first, Abbott’s patent expired, or a court
declared the patent invalid, and Abbott agreed to make payments to the
generics.167 A district court later held Abbott’s patent invalid.168 Pharmaceu-
tical wholesalers then sued Abbott and the settling defendants, alleging that
their settlement agreements were per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that the arrangement should be
evaluated under the rule of reason. The court held that that the reasonable-
ness of the agreements should not be condemned because the patent was
subsequently declared invalid, so long as the “exclusionary effects of a set-
tlement” were “reasonably within the scope of the patent.”169 The provision
for reverse payments from the patent holder to the infringers did not call for
per se liability under the antitrust laws.170 The court was unable to conclude
on the record that the exclusionary effects of the settlement agreements were
greater than the exclusionary effects of the patents, and directed the lower
court on remand to consider such factors as the magnitude of the reverse
payments in relation to the lost profits that would occur if the patent were
declared invalid, the costs the parties expected to save from not litigating,
and the parties’ expectations with respect to the outcome of the patent in-
fringement case.171
After the Cardizem and Valley Drug decisions, the FTC condemned a
reverse payment settlement of a patent infringement action as unlawful
under the FTC Act in In re Schering Plough.172 Under the settlement at issue
in that case, Schering agreed to make payments totaling $60 million to the
infringement defendant Upsher, and Upsher agreed not to market any ge-
165. Id.
166. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
167. Id. at 1300–01.
168. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28,
1998).
169. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306–08.
170. Id. at 1309–10.
171. Id. The Federal Circuit, applying the law of the Second Circuit, reached a similar
result in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F. 3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008). See also In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005).
172. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1060–61 (2003), available at http://www
.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/9910256/schering-plough-corporation-upsher-smith-
laboratories-american.
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neric version of Schering’s product before September 2001. Upsher also li-
censed Schering to market six Upsher products in specified territories.
Although the FTC declined to apply a rule of per se illegality, it refused to
inquire into the merits of the patent infringement claim in finding the settle-
ment unlawful. It held that “it is possible to envision special hypothetical
cases where some payments from pioneers to generics could be efficient and
beneficial to consumers” but found insufficient evidence to support such a
claim in that case.
Schering-Plough appealed the FTC’s order to the Eleventh Circuit,
which vacated the Commission’s order.173 The Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in 2006174 after the Solicitor General surprisingly broke with the FTC
position, arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion did not create a direct
conflict with any other Circuit and that the patent settlements issue was not
well-presented in that case.175 The Solicitor General again reversed course in
the Obama administration, arguing that “reverse payment” agreements are
presumptively unlawful.176 The Eleventh Circuit held firm throughout these
changes in administration, rejecting FTC’s position yet again in its 2012
decision in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, which held reverse payment
settlements lawful so long as they fall within the patent’s exclusionary
potential.177
In that case Solvay Pharmaceuticals, the patent holder, brought an in-
fringement action against two generic companies that had filed ANDAs for
generic versions of the pioneer product AndroGel. The patent litigation was
still pending when the Hatch-Waxman thirty-month stay expired, allowing
FDA approval of the ANDAs to become effective. Solvay then entered into
settlement agreements with the generics. The generics agreed not to market
generic versions of AndroGel under their ANDAs until 2015 (five years
before the expiration of the patent). Meanwhile, the generics agreed to mar-
ket branded AndroGel on behalf of Solvay and to serve as back-up manufac-
turers for Solvay, and Solvay agreed to make millions of dollars a year in
payments to the generics.
FTC found the settlement unlawful. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
held that an allegation that the patentee was unlikely to win its infringement
lawsuit could not establish the illegality of a settlement and reiterated its
holding that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a re-
173. Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1071 (11th Cir.
2005).
174. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
175. Brief of United States as amicus curiae, Schering-Plough, 548 U.S. 919 (No. 05-
273), at *33-35, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f216300/216358.htm.
176. Brief of the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, Arkansas
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-2851-
cv(L), 05-2852-cv (CON), 05-2863-cv (CON)), 2009 WL 8385027, at *11.
177. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
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verse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its an-
ticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent.”178
In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit analyzed reverse payment set-
tlements in much the same way as the Eleventh Circuit,179 while the Third
Circuit held reverse payment settlements presumptively illegal.180
Finally the Supreme Court agreed to review the issue in the AndroGel
case, which became known as FTC v. Actavis,181 and reversed the Eleventh
Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Breyer, a five Justice majority held that a
reverse payment settlement agreement might violate the antitrust laws under
rule of reason analysis and that the Eleventh Circuit should therefore have
allowed the FTC’s lawsuit to proceed.182 But the majority made clear that
rule of reason analysis is not likely to require determining whether the un-
derlying patent action was meritorious in order to decide whether a settle-
ment with a reverse payment was reasonable. Instead, the Court invited the
antitrust courts to continue to punt on patent analysis, at least when the set-
tlement involves a payment from the plaintiff to the defendants.
The majority opinion appears to acknowledge the rights conferred by a
patent as conferring immunity under the antitrust laws, but it nonetheless
steered the courts away from analyzing the merits of the underlying patent
dispute in a number of ways. For one thing, it called for a balance of the
policies of the patent laws with the policies of the antitrust laws in deciding
whether the settlement agreement is within the scope of the patent,183 leaving
open the possibility that a pay-for-delay settlement might still violate the
antitrust laws even if the patent were valid and infringed. In rejecting the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach, however, the majority noted that an invalid pat-
ent confers no right to exclude competitors and that “even a valid patent
confers no right to exclude products or processes that do not actually in-
fringe,”184 suggesting that perhaps the validity and scope of the patent matter
and should therefore be considered. Yet the majority did not fault the Elev-
enth Circuit for failing to consider whether the ANDA product would have
infringed the patent. Instead, the majority acknowledged the circuit court’s
concern that antitrust litigation should not require costly and complex re-
litigation of the settled patent infringement action within the antitrust ac-
178. Id. at 1312.
179. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Anitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 396–97 (2d Cir. 2005).
180. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
181. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
182. Id. at 2225; see also id. at 2233 (characterizing prior cases as seeking “to accommo-
date patent and antitrust policies, finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless
patent law policy offsets the antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition.”).
183. Id. at 2231 (“[T]his Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both
relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law
immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”).
184. Id.
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tion,185 but concluded that “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent
validity to answer the antitrust question.”186 The Eleventh Circuit’s approach
of immunizing reverse payment settlements from antitrust attack to avoid
having to address the patent issues thus “throws out the baby with the bath
water.”187 Instead, the Court suggested as an administratively feasible alter-
native that courts look to the size of the reverse payment as an indication
that the patent case lacked merit: “An unexplained large reverse payment
itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the
patent’s survival,” and the size of the reverse payment thus “can provide a
workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to
conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”188
The Court presented its own approach as an application of the rule of
reason, in contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s approach of near-automatic anti-
trust immunity to reverse payment settlements.”189 But if the reverse pay-
ment alone will support an inference that the patent was weak without the
need for “detailed exploration,” the majority’s approach treads close to a per
se rule against reverse payment settlements. The Court put forth the possibil-
ity that reverse payments may sometimes be justified, notwithstanding their
anticompetitive effects. A reverse payment, for example, may amount to no
more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through
the settlement, or it may reflect compensation for other services that the
generic has promised to perform—such as distributing the patented product
or helping to develop a market for it.190
Notably absent from the Court’s list of justifications for a reverse pay-
ment is a patent holder’s wish to avoid the risk that a valuable patent will be
held invalid, with a resulting loss of expected revenues. Indeed, the Court
said that if the reason for the reverse payment is “a desire to maintain and to
share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other
justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.”191 Nor
does the Court suggest that the parties might call into question the “workable
surrogate” for a determination of the patent’s weakness by showing that the
underlying patent infringement case was, in fact, strong. In other words, a
185. Id. at 2234 (“The [Eleventh] Circuit’s . . . underlying practical concern consists of
its fear that antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement would require the parties to
litigate the validity of the patent in order to demonstrate what would have happened to compe-
tition in the absence of the settlement. Any such litigation will prove time consuming, com-
plex, and expensive.”).
186. Id. at 2236.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2236–37; cf. supra notes 169–171 and accompanying text, suggesting that
settlement of even a strong patent infringement case might be expected to include a reverse
payment.
189. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
190. See id. at 2236.
191. Id. at 2237.
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plaintiff’s willingness to share the rents from a patent with a defendant who
challenges validity and infringement is enough to permit a court to find an
antitrust violation without further assessment of the merits of the patent in-
fringement case.
Three dissenting justices (Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas) apparently
would have punted the patent issues in the opposite direction, protecting the
settlement from antitrust liability on the assumption that it “did not exceed
the scope of the patent.”192 The dissenters explained that “[a] patent carves
out an exception to the applicability of antitrust laws. The correct approach
should therefore be to ask whether the settlement gives [the patent holder]
monopoly power beyond what the patent already gave it.”193
Although the dissenters asserted that “the scope of the patent—i.e., the
rights conferred by the patent—forms the zone within which the patent
holder may operate without facing antitrust liability,”194 they did not indicate
how antitrust courts should ascertain what the scope of the patent is, beyond
noting that it “should be determined by reference to patent law” rather than
antitrust law.195 In particular, they did not indicate that the Actavis case
should be remanded for a determination of the scope of the patent at issue
under patent law. Instead, they simply assumed that the settlement agree-
ment was within the scope of the patent, evidently based on a belief that the
majority accepted that characterization.196 But both validity and infringement
were contested in the patent infringement action and remained unresolved at
the time of settlement, and no findings were made on these issues in the
antitrust action. The dissent agreed with the majority that “we’re not quite
certain if the patent is actually valid, or if the competitor is infringing it.”197
Yet somehow this uncertainty as to validity and infringement did not cast
doubt on the dissenters’ conviction that the settlement agreement was within
the scope of the monopoly power conferred by the patent. On the other hand,
the dissent warned that the majority’s approach will inevitably lead defend-
ants to raise their patent rights as a defense in antitrust actions, casting doubt
on the majority’s assertion that it will not normally be necessary to litigate
patent validity to resolve the antitrust case.198 The dissent concluded by an-
nouncing a preference to “keep things as they were.”199 Perhaps this is an
endorsement of the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, in which settlement of a
patent infringement action is immune from antitrust attack “absent sham liti-
192. Id. at 2239 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2238.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2240 (emphasis in original).
196. The dissent states that “the Court . . . is willing to accept that Solvay’s actions did
not exceed the scope of its patent.” Id. (citation omitted).
197. Id.
198. See id. at 2244.
199. Id. at 2247.
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gation or fraud in obtaining the patent . . . so long as its anticompetitive
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”200
In sum, although they disagreed about which side should prevail and
although there is considerable ambiguity in both opinions, both the majority
and the dissent in Actavis left considerable room for antitrust courts to con-
tinue to punt on patent issues in reviewing settlement agreements.
C. Patent Punting Leads Antitrust Courts Astray
It is remarkable that across the wide range of views on reverse payment
settlements expressed in the Circuit split, Actavis opinions, and FTC, no-
body has made any effort to engage with the merits of the underlying patent
infringement actions. Even opinions that purport to protect only those settle-
ments falling within the “scope of the patent” show no willingness to assess
whether, but for the reverse payment settlement, the patentee would actually
have obtained an injunction excluding the generic, or the generic would have
been permitted to enter the market. In a particularly apt metaphor, the Elev-
enth Circuit called merits review within the antitrust case “a turducken
task”201—a turducken being a chicken stuffed inside a duck stuffed inside a
turkey. Everybody seems to agree that reviewing the merits is too much for
the courts to swallow—they disagree only over whether the default position
should be antitrust immunity or liability.
While it is easy to understand the aversion of antitrust agencies and
courts to analyzing the merits of settled patent infringement actions, it is not
clear how they can avoid that inquiry if the rights conferred by patents have
any relevance to antitrust analysis. Even if the Actavis decision makes both
patent and antitrust policies “relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent
monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by
a patent,”202 analysis of the patent infringement case forms at least one part
of the inquiry. And even under the Eleventh Circuit approach that the Ac-
tavis dissent would have approved, in order to determine whether a settle-
ment falls within the “exclusionary potential” of the patent, it would seem
necessary to at least interpret the patent and compare it to the product and
the scope of approval sought by the defendant. Yet neither opinion directs
the lower courts to undertake that analysis, instead inviting continued patent
punting through reliance on flawed proxies for consideration of the merits of
the patent case.
1. Limited Signal Value of the Direction of Payment
The information communicated by the direction of payment in a settle-
ment has limited value to a court making an antitrust determination. Though
200. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012).
201. Id. at 1315.
202. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
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the Actavis majority saw something unnatural and inherently suspect in re-
verse payments, observing that the reverse payment “form of settlement is
unusual,”203 other unusual features of litigation under the Hatch-Waxman
Act make reverse payments likely in this context, whether the plaintiff’s
case is strong or weak.204 Although it is possible, as the Actavis majority
assumes, that a patent holder that agrees to make such a payment thinks it
has a weak case, it is also possible that the patent holder considers the patent
so valuable that it is willing to pay a significant premium to avoid even a
small risk of invalidity.205
The Hatch-Waxman Act promotes resolution of infringement disputes
prior to generic entry. Thus the statute provides for an automatic thirty-
month stay of FDA approval of an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification,
so long as the innovator files an infringement action within forty-five
days.206 This provides an opportunity for the parties to litigate disputes about
patent validity and infringement before the generic product enters the mar-
ket,207 and therefore before the innovator has incurred any compensable
damages. This is an important design feature that protects both parties. Ge-
neric entry typically causes a sharp drop in the price of the product, with
resulting revenue loss for the patent holder far in excess of revenue gains for
the generic. If infringement litigation had to await generic entry, the patent
holder could quickly incur damages that exceed the generic’s ability to sat-
isfy a judgment. For this reason, a generic may be reluctant to enter the
market prior to resolution of the infringement action even after the Hatch-
Waxman stay expires and its ANDA becomes effective.
Indeed, the term “reverse payment” is something of a misnomer, falsely
implying that payment would ordinarily flow in the opposite direction. The
Hatch-Waxman Act explicitly prohibits the courts from awarding damages
against a defendant who has merely filed an ANDA.208 At most, a prevailing
plaintiff can get an injunction against entry of the generic product and an
extension of the stay of FDA approval until the end of the patent term. A
prevailing defendant can, at most, get a judgment that the patent is invalid or
203. Id.; see also id. at 2233 (“In the traditional examples cited above, a party with a
claim (or counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or less than the value of its claim.
In reverse payment settlements, in contrast, a party with no claim for damages (something that
is usually true of a paragraph IV litigation defendant) walks away with money simply so it will
stay away from the patentee’s market.”).
204. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 51 (2009) (describing the increasing use of
reverse payment settlements under the Act).
205. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075; see also,
supra, text accompanying notes 172–176.
206. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
207. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 281, 293–94 (2011).
208. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C)(2012).
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not infringed (and, if the defendant was the first to file an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification for the product, a six-month period of generic
exclusivity before FDA will approve another ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification for the same product). The financial value of a win to the plain-
tiff is much higher than the financial value of a win to the defendant.209 Due
to this disparity in the stakes of the parties, a transfer from the patent holder
to the alleged infringer is likely a settlement that reflects a compromise on
each side.
To be sure, the underlying patent infringement action may well be weak
on the merits. For reasons explained above,210 the combination of the Hatch-
Waxman boost and FDA patent punting makes it advantageous for innova-
tors to pursue weak ANDA infringement actions that they are unlikely to
win on the merits. These weak cases may also lead to settlement agreements
that call for payments from patent holders to asserted infringers. The Actavis
majority was understandably concerned that settlements of weak patent in-
fringement cases that would otherwise likely have been resolved in favor of
the generic will leave consumers worse off than they would have been if the
parties had pursued the litigation to final judgment.211 But the presence of a
reverse payment term is not a reliable indicator of a weak case, and the
assertion that such a payment may serve as a “workable surrogate” for con-
sideration of the merits of the infringement action suggests a misunderstand-
ing of the peculiar context of infringement litigation prior to market entry
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Because the majority believed that a reverse payment is a reliable indi-
cation of a weak case, it did not address the possibility that the patent holder
might otherwise have prevailed. But if the underlying lawsuit would other-
wise have ended in an injunction against the generic, it is not clear how
consumers are worse off as a result of the settlement, even if the settlement
includes a reverse payment. What matters to consumers is not the direction
of payment in the settlement, but the timing of generic entry that brings
price-lowering competition.212
209. Indeed, even after the 30-month stay has lifted, the generic may be reluctant to enter
the market because the risk of liability would substantially exceed the profits the generic could
earn by selling a competing generic product over the same period. This is because prices for
generics are substantially lower than the prices that an innovator can charge as the sole source
of a patent-protected product. See Dolin, supra note 207, at 292 n.59; see also Crane, supra
note 157, at 762–65.
210. See supra notes 206–208 and accompanying text.
211. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234–35 (2013).
212. The analysis in text considers only the interest of consumers in price-lowering com-
petition, and not their interest in promoting innovation through the incentive of patent-pro-
tected monopoly pricing. The latter interest is presumably better served by allowing the
holders of valid patents to exclude competitors until the end of the patent term, and may be
harmed by reverse payments that divert a portion of the patent rents away from innovators and
towards generics, thereby undermining the value of patent incentives.
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By focusing antitrust scrutiny on the false indicator of reverse payments,
the Court ignored the fact that equally or more anticompetitive patent settle-
ments can be constructed with no reverse payment at all, as discussed next.
2. Easy Anticompetitive Work-Arounds
One justification that the Actavis majority identified as supporting the
legality of some reverse payments is that the “payment may reflect compen-
sation for other services that the generic has promised to perform—such as
distributing the patented item or helping to develop a market for that
item.”213 In one type of patent settlement case, the generic agrees to dis-
tribute either the innovator’s drug or an “authorized generic” and receives a
promise of payment for its services as part of the settlement. A second type
of case arises when a generic and innovator want to avoid the scrutiny trig-
gered by a reverse payment altogether. In such a case, they reverse the ap-
parent direction of payment by having the generic promise to pay the
patentee for the right to be a distributor.214 In the first model, the generic
becomes an agent selling on behalf of the innovator and receives compensa-
tion for its efforts, while in the second the generic is a licensee that remits
some share of revenues to the innovator as a royalty.215 In that case, we have
both the absence of a reverse payment and the fact of early generic entry,
which should easily satisfy the Actavis rule of reason standard.
From the perspective of the consumer, however, such agreements may
be worse than the reverse payments at issue in Actavis.216 Suppose, for ex-
ample, that prior to generic entry, the monopoly mark-up per unit is equal to
$1. Now suppose that the innovator brings a patent infringement lawsuit
with a low probability of success. Prior to adjudication of that lawsuit, the
patent holder settles with the generic, making the generic its authorized ge-
neric distributor until the end of the patent term. The generic agrees to remit
to the patent holder a royalty of $1 per unit of sales. Unless the generic’s
marginal costs of production or distribution are lower than those of the inno-
vator, we now have (1) early generic entry, (2) no reverse payment, and (3) a
213. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
214. See Crane, supra note 157, at 765.
215. See id. In two post-Actavis decisions involving complex settlement structures, the
District of New Jersey dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaints, finding that the settlements did not
involve “reverse payments” within the meaning of Actavis, even though they involved some
cessation of competition between the innovator and the generic. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig.,
2014 WL 4543502 (No. 3:12–cv–02389 (PGS) D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014); In re Effexor XR Anti-
trust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410 (No. 11–5479 (PGS)(LHG) D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014). In Lipitor, the
generic agreed to settle Pfizer’s patent infringement challenge by agreeing to a later entry date
in the U.S. market in exchange for Pfizer dropping other patent litigation for damages for a
token $1 million payment and allowing the generic to launch generic Lipitor in 11 foreign
markets prior to the patent expiration date. In Effexor, Wyeth and Teva settled without cash
payment from Wyeth to Teva but with Wyeth’s promise not to market an authorized generic
version of Effexor during Teva’s 180-day exclusivity period.
216. See id. at 765–66.
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continuation of the same monopoly pricing. Indeed, because the licensing
agreement continues until the expiration of the patent, it may leave consum-
ers paying monopoly prices for longer than some reverse payment settle-
ments that permit generic entry before the expiration of the patent.
It is not necessary to set the royalty equal to the full monopoly over-
charge in order to produce anticompetitive results relative to a judgment for
the generic. Suppose the royalty is set at 90 percent of the monopoly over-
charge, leading to immediate price reductions. But since the first generic to
market ordinarily sets its price around 70–80 percent of the brand,217 this
settlement deprives consumers of a much larger price decrease they might
have received in the but-for world.
This example is not fanciful: FDA currently lists 673 authorized gener-
ics on the market.218 As long as the agreements authorizing distribution of
these products do not involve reverse payments, they will not show up on
courts’ post-Actavis radar screen. Antitrust lawyers are therefore likely to
push clients toward settlements of this nature that avoid the red flag of re-
verse payments. Circumvention of the reverse payment rule established in
Actavis is not difficult and need not diminish anticompetitive effects.
The direction in which payment flows in a settlement agreement is not
what drives anticompetitive effects. What drives these effects is the
probability that but for the settlement, the generic and innovator would have
entered into price competition. There are ample means other than reverse
payments to soften competition between branded and generic drug firms.
Actavis does not merely ignore this possibility. By crediting licensing agree-
ments as a robustly procompetitive defense, it compounds the error of the
decision by appearing to grant categorical immunity to other forms of an-
ticompetitive agreement.
3. Limited Relevance of Anticompetitive Motivations
Some language in the Actavis majority opinion goes beyond treating
reverse payments as a signal of a weak patent case, suggesting that antitrust
217. See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS,
1, 35 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds. 1991) (“[G]eneric drugs sell for a substantial
discount from the price of the branded drug; the estimates suggest that with a single generic
entrant, the generic price is roughly 60 percent of the branded drug price.”); David Reiffen &
Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37, 44 (2005)
(explaining that their study showed a single generic entrant would set its price at 88% of the
branded price); see also Caves et al., supra, at 44–45 (finding that generic producers depress
the branded drug’s price and “enter the market quoting prices much lower than those of their
branded competitors”).
218. FDA Listing of Authorized Generics as of Jan 9, 2015, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Jan. 9, 2015) http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/UCM183
605.pdf.
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liability is appropriate if the motivation for the agreement is to avoid the risk
of generic competition by maintaining and sharing the rents from the patent,
even if the risk of invalidity is small:
The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment.
But, be that as it may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely
seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that
consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. . . . Al-
though the parties may have reasons to prefer settlements that in-
clude reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: What are
those reasons? If the basic reason [for a reverse payment] is a desire
to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in
the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely
to forbid the arrangement.219
It is not clear why the Court regarded the intent of the parties in entering
into a reverse payment agreement as “the relevant antitrust question,” nor
why an intent to maintain and to share patent-generated profits would indi-
cate an antitrust violation. Incentives to recover patent-generated monopoly
profits are a feature, not a bug, in the patent system, serving to motivate and
reward innovators for making new inventions. Patents can only serve this
purpose if their owners affirmatively seek such profits, and the maintenance
of monopoly profits often requires asserting patent rights against infringers
in litigation. If the point of patents is to motivate innovation in pursuit of
monopoly profits, it makes little sense to hold that patent holders run afoul
of the antitrust laws when the same motivation leads them to settle meritori-
ous infringement actions rather than take a small risk of losing. Moreover, it
is hard to see how a wish to maintain monopoly profits can distinguish
plaintiffs with weak claims from those with strong claims. A wish to main-
tain profits is ubiquitous in litigation over valuable patents.
What matters to consumers is not the anticompetitive intent of the par-
ties in entering into the agreement, but the anticompetitive effects of such an
agreement. The presence of a reverse payment in the agreement may indi-
cate that the patent holder is concerned about the possibility of an adverse
judgment, but such concern is to be expected from a risk-averse holder of a
valuable patent and does not necessarily indicate that the plaintiff is other-
wise likely to lose. The terms of the settlement may reveal something about
the parties’ assessment of litigation risks, but they are a very noisy signal,
hardly a substitute for direct consideration of the merits.
In focusing on the subjective motivation for the settlement, the Actavis
majority seemed to suggest that any motivation by the patent holder to elimi-
219. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236–37 (2013).
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nate litigation risks is inherently anticompetitive.220 This strange assumption
is at odds with the ordinary operation of the rule of reason. The motivation
to suppress competition is present in many business arrangements that easily
satisfy the rule of reason.221 Moreover, the motivation for litigation settle-
ments typically includes a wish to insure against the possibility of an adverse
outcome, and in the case of patent settlements, an adverse outcome for the
patentee typically means more competition. Yet the Actavis majority sug-
gested that such a motivation likely renders the settlement anticompetitive,
at least in the absence of some other justification.
Perhaps this approach leaves room for future courts to recognize that the
pro-competitive benefits of a settlement outweigh the risk that a settlement
will defer price-lowering competition. It is well-documented that these bene-
fits are not limited to the elimination of direct litigation costs, as the majority
acknowledged.222 Indirect litigation costs often exceed attorneys’ and expert
witness fees.223 Early elimination of uncertainty around generic entry can
allow for better planning by both innovators and generics, as well as inven-
tion around the patent.224 The settlement option increases the generic’s flexi-
bility in challenging the innovator’s patent and hence decreases the costs of
generic challenges.225 Many settlements allow for generic entry years before
the expiration of the patent, a possibility that would be eliminated by the
innovator’s victory in the patent litigation.226 In ordinary rule of reason anal-
ysis, one would analyze and weigh these factors against the possibility of
earlier generic entry in the absence of settlement as a result of a judgment in
favor of the generic. But if antitrust courts and agencies continue to punt on
determining the likely outcome of the litigation, it is unclear how they can
properly assess these possibilities to determine the net anticompetitive ef-
fects of settlements. There is no substitute for direct engagement with the
220. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2234.
221. See Crane, supra note 157, at 778 (“A patentee’s intentions are virtually always
explicitly ‘anticompetitive’ in the precise sense in which antitrust lawyers mean those words—
the patentee wishes to suppress the competition for its patented good in order to preserve a
stream of monopoly rents from that good.”).
222. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
223. See Crane, supra note 157, at 757–59.
224. Id. at 762–65.
225. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 256
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing expert declaration of Dr. Jerry Hausman for the proposition that “[t]o
maximize these incentives [for generics to challenge branded patents], a generic company
should be permitted to choose not only when to commence patent litigation, but also when to
terminate it”).
226. See Michael A. Carrier, Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive Behavior, 3
HAST. SCI. & TECH. L.J. 441, 442–44 (2011) (discussing early entry provisions in agreements
between pioneer and generic companies regarding the medication Provigil, wherein the generic
companies agreed in 2006 to delay market entry until 2012, when the patents were set to
expire in 2015).
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strength of the patent infringement claim, including both validity and in-
fringement issues.
Like the patent punting strategies deployed by FDA, the patent punting
strategies deployed by the antitrust courts threaten to upset the balance stuck
in the Hatch-Waxman Act. This balance both protects innovators from in-
fringing generic competition and encourages generics to compete, as long as
they do not infringe any valid patents. The FDA strategy of deference to
innovators errs on one side of the balance, while the Actavis strategy of
presuming anticompetitive effects for reverse payment settlements errs on
the other side. FDA’s patent punting strategy leads to too much infringement
litigation, including weak cases, while the Actavis patent punting strategy
makes it more difficult to settle that litigation, including strong cases. The
Hatch-Waxman Act is a complex compromise between the interests of inno-
vators and generics, leaving room for patent punters to find support for their
moves in those provisions that favor one side or the other.227 But the net
result has been unnecessary costs, delays, and harm to consumers.
Antitrust courts would do a better job of determining which settlements
harmed consumers if they were willing to examine the merits of the settled
infringement actions rather than relying on misleading proxies such as re-
verse payments and inferences about intent to avoid litigation risks. But the
best antitrust courts can do is award damages long after consumers have
suffered the consequences of improper delays in generic entry. Under the
misleading guidance of Actavis, a more likely outcome is that patent litigants
will change the way they write their settlement agreements to avoid raising
red flags (such as reverse payments), while using equivalent provisions to
take advantage of the inability of patent-punting courts to tell which settle-
ments have actually harmed consumers.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF
FDA AND THE COURTS
FDA is in a much better position than antitrust courts to minimize harm
to consumers. Through timely regulatory oversight of which patents get the
Hatch-Waxman boost, FDA could limit the attractiveness to patent holders
of pursuing weak infringement actions, and thus limit the opportunities for
deferring generic entry through anticompetitive settlements.
FDA oversight has significant advantages over litigation in minimizing
abuses of the Hatch-Waxman scheme. First, FDA is in a position to detect
abuses at a much earlier stage than the courts, and thus to minimize im-
proper delays in generic entry. Litigation, at best, leads to deferred decisions
on the merits, and may instead lead to collusive settlements of weak claims
that could have been avoided through active administrative oversight at an
earlier stage. Second, FDA is better able than the courts to make certain
227. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234; 1989 Proposal, supra note 54, § V.Q.3, at 28,909.
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statutory determinations that play a central role in the Hatch-Waxman
scheme. More specifically, FDA’s technological and regulatory expertise
give it an advantage over the courts in examining the relationship between
patent claims and the scope of regulatory approval under NDAs and ANDAs
to determine which patents are entitled to the Hatch-Waxman boost. Prior
administrative review would not displace litigation but could determine
whether a patent is entitled to cause an automatic thirty-month stay of ap-
proval of an ANDA. It could exclude from the Orange Book those patents
that could not reasonably be asserted against an ANDA and give courts the
benefit of FDA’s assessment of the relationship between patents and FDA
approval documents. We consider each of these advantages below. We then
consider how best to address FDA’s reluctance to take on a larger role in
administrative oversight of patent matters.
A. Timing
The Hatch-Waxman Act reflects a clear plan for the timing of generic
entry. It replaced a system in which the costs of regulatory approval main-
tained a de facto entry barrier that excluded generics long after patent expi-
ration with a new set of rules that lowered regulatory entry barriers to
accelerate generic entry once relevant patents had expired. After an initial
five-year period of regulatory exclusivity, a generic may be approved at
lower cost by using an ANDA rather than a more costly NDA. But the tim-
ing of ANDA approvals also depends on the duration of patents that meet
certain statutory criteria. The effect is to exclude generics during the term of
the specified patents if they are valid and would be infringed by the ANDA
product, while allowing ANDA approvals to take effect immediately
thereafter.
Many features of the Hatch-Waxman Act reveal a clear goal of permit-
ting generic entry as soon as possible once previously approved products and
uses are no longer covered by any valid patents that meet the statutory crite-
ria. One important change under the Hatch-Waxman Act was to modify the
definition of patent infringement to allow for the completion of all prerequi-
sites to regulatory approval during the patent term. Overturning a judicial
decision that held the use of a patented drug in clinical trials to be an act of
infringement,228 Congress created a new statutory infringement exemption
for acts “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submis-
sion of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs.”229 This change paved the way for prompt generic entry
by making it possible to carry out any necessary clinical trials during the
patent term. The Hatch-Waxman Act also explicitly provides for the submis-
sion of ANDAs during the patent term that would become effective on the
228. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
229. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
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patent expiration date.230 This eliminated the previous de facto extension in
the duration of market exclusivity beyond the term of the patent to cover the
time necessary to test products and gain regulatory approval.
Other statutory provisions show an effort to minimize delays in generic
entry as a result of patents that are invalid or not infringed and to accelerate
any infringement litigation. For example, the Hatch-Waxman Act ordinarily
provides innovators with a five-year period of regulatory exclusivity before
a competitor may submit an ANDA, but it permits submission as much as
one year earlier if the ANDA includes a paragraph IV certification challeng-
ing patent validity or infringement.231 The Hatch-Waxman Act further en-
courages prompt patent challenges by rewarding the first generic to submit
an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification with 180 days of generic exclu-
sivity before FDA may approve another ANDA with a paragraph IV certifi-
cation for the same product.232 The statute accelerates litigation by requiring
the challenger to provide notice of the basis for the patent challenge within
twenty days.233 It further encourages patent holders to assert any infringe-
ment claims promptly by providing that unless the patent holder responds by
filing an infringement action within forty-five days, approval of the ANDA
shall be made effective immediately.234 To ensure the dispute is ripe for judi-
cial resolution, Congress modified the definition of infringement to include
submitting an ANDA “for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is
claimed in a patent.”235 The statute mandates that “each of the parties shall
reasonably cooperate in expediting the action,” and authorizes the court to
adjust the duration of the thirty-month stay if either party fails to do so.236
Even the thirty-month stay, although it defers generic entry temporarily, sets
a limit on how long patent litigation may delay regulatory approval of
ANDAs. Litigation may continue thereafter, but prolonged litigation cannot
defer regulatory approval beyond the stay period without a court order to
that effect.237
Finally, Congress set limits on the kinds of patents that are relevant to
the timing of ANDA approval.238 The statute requires that innovators iden-
tify in their NDAs:
any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted
the application or which claims a method of using such drug and
with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasona-
230. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(B)(vii)(III), 355(j)(5)(B)(ii) (2012).
231. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
232. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
233. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
234. Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
235. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012).
236. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
237. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 66–68.
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bly be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the
manufacture use, or sale of the drug.239
In parallel language, the statute requires that ANDAs include a certifica-
tion “with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug . . . or which
claims a use for such listed drug for which the applicant is seeking ap-
proval.”240 Other patents that might be infringed by a generic, such as pat-
ents on other methods of use or on manufacturing methods, may not be used
to delay the submission or approval of an ANDA, although they might still
be asserted in an infringement action. Moreover, the Hatch-Waxman Act
does not require that an ANDA include a certification for a method of use
patent that does not claim a use for which the ANDA seeks approval, instead
permitting a statement “that the method of use patent does not claim such a
use.”241 By limiting the kinds of patents that will automatically defer the use
of ANDAs, Congress limited regulatory delays on generic entry without dis-
turbing patent infringement remedies.
These provisions recognize that time is of the essence in determining
when generic competition may begin. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides an
opportunity for litigating disputes about patent validity and infringement and
for a temporary stay of regulatory approval during litigation, but it also ac-
celerates the time frame for litigation and sets statutory limits on the kinds of
patents that can delay regulatory approval of ANDAs. It gave FDA a signifi-
cant role in administering these patent provisions, although FDA has sought
to minimize that role. When innovators submit patent information as part of
their NDAs, they submit that information to FDA.242 It is FDA that the stat-
ute directs to publish the information.243 And when generics address these
patents in their ANDAs, whether through a section vii certification or a sec-
tion viii statement, the submission goes directly to FDA.
FDA thus stands at the front door of the Hatch-Waxman patent provi-
sions. It is the first to learn which patents innovators believe are relevant to
their NDAs, and the first to learn how generics plan to address those patents
in their ANDAs. This position gives FDA—and only FDA—a timely oppor-
tunity to determine whether particular patents are properly disclosed as part
of a particular NDA, and whether they are properly addressed through a
section vii certification or a section viii statement in a particular ANDA.
These determinations are critical in determining when FDA approval of
ANDAs may become effective. Yet because it would have to read patents in
order to make these determinations, FDA refuses to take administrative re-
sponsibility and insists that this must be a job for the courts.
239. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
240. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
241. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
242. See id. §§ 355(b)(1), 355(c)(2).
243. Id.
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To justify its preferred course of patent punting, FDA has ignored the
manifest legislative purpose to resolve disputes in a timely fashion, while
giving a very broad reading to the Hatch-Waxman litigation provisions. Be-
cause Congress provided for litigation in the district courts of certain dis-
putes about patent validity and infringement, FDA has concluded that it is
exempt from any obligation of administrative oversight of the Hatch-Wax-
man patent provisions in individual cases. The result has been a failure of
effective enforcement of the statutory limitations on which patents can defer
regulatory approval of ANDAs.
In the absence of administrative oversight, innovators can decide which
of their patents qualifies for a thirty-month stay of regulatory approval. The
2003 statutory provision for counterclaims to correct improper patent listings
does not undo the delays these listings cause. By the time a counterclaim is
filed, the improper listing (or improper use code) has already compelled the
generic to take steps that it might otherwise have avoided, including submit-
ting a paragraph IV certification for the patent and giving notice to the patent
holder, thus triggering an infringement action and thirty-month stay of
ANDA approval. Much of that stay is likely to have run its course before the
court can grant the only remedy that the statute permits: an order requiring
the NDA holder to correct or delete the previously submitted patent informa-
tion.244 A court cannot turn back the clock and allow the ANDA to become
effective at an earlier point. Even if the patent holder loses on the counter-
claim, it will likely have recovered much of the value of the Hatch-Waxman
boost, and consumers will have paid the price. FDA’s insistence on punting
all patent issues to the courts thus frustrates Congress’ efforts to replace de
facto regulatory entry barriers with a more deliberate and carefully timed
approach with statutory rules about which patents can defer generic entry.
Only FDA is in a position to take timely steps to prevent irrelevant patents
from deferring its own ANDA approvals.
B. Expertise
Another significant advantage of FDA in determining which patents
should defer ANDA approval arises from its expertise as a regulatory agency
charged with overseeing approvals of NDAs and ANDAs. This expertise is
particularly important to determinations of which patents are appropriate for
listing in the Orange Book and which patents may be addressed in a section
viii statement rather than a section vii certification. These determinations are
244. Indeed, it is not clear whether the district court could even direct FDA to terminate
the 30-month stay without first determining that the patent is invalid or not infringed. See Kurt
A. Karst, Does a Hatch-Waxman Patent Delisting Counterclaim Terminate a 30-Month Litiga-
tion Stay?, FDA L. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2012, 6:58 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_
hyman_phelps/2012/11/does-a-hatch-waxman-patent-delisting-counterclaim-terminate-a-30-
month-litigation-stay.html.
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unique to the Hatch-Waxman Act, and require understanding the meaning of
NDAs and ANDAs.
The Hatch-Waxman Act limits the patents that innovators are required
to disclose to those that claim the drug or a method of using the drug “with
respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted
if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or
sale of the drug.” FDA has engaged in rulemaking to interpret these provi-
sions.245 Partly in response to the recommendations of FTC, FDA has speci-
fied in detail what kinds of patents are appropriate for listing, addressing
patents on polymorphs, intermediates, metabolites, and formulations. FDA
has further clarified that whether a patent is appropriate for listing depends
upon its relationship to the scope of approval in an approved or pending
NDA.246 Only those patents that claim either a drug or a method of using the
drug that is the subject of a pending or approved NDA (or an amendment or
supplement to an NDA) may be submitted for listing.247 Application of this
rule thus requires a comparison between patent claims and the scope of ap-
proval sought or approved in the NDA. FDA, of course, is the agency that
reviews NDAs and has considerable expertise in understanding what they
mean.
Similarly, FDA has an expertise advantage over the courts in determin-
ing whether an ANDA should address a particular method of use patent
through a section vii certification or a section viii statement. The statute
requires that an ANDA include a section vii certification “with respect to
each patent which claims the listed drug . . . or which claims a use for such
listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval.”248 Conversely, in
the case of “. . . a method of use patent which does not claim a use for which
the applicant is seeking approval under this section,” the applicant need not
submit a section vii certification. Instead, the statute requires that the ANDA
include “a [section viii] statement that the method of use patent does not
claim such a use.”249 FDA regulations confirm that the certification and no-
tice requirements do not apply “to a use patent that claims no uses for which
the applicant is seeking approval.”250 The choice between a section vii certi-
fication (such as a Paragraph IV certification that the patent is invalid or not
infringed)251 and a section viii statement (that the patent is a method of use
patent that does not claim a use for which the applicant is seeking approval)
thus requires a comparison of the patent claims to the scope of approval
sought in the ANDA. FDA, as the agency charged with reviewing ANDAs
245. See supra Part II.
246. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2014).
247. Id.
248. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012).
249. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
250. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.95(a)(3), 314.94(a)(12)(iii)(A).
251. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
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and determining the appropriate scope of approval, has a clear expertise ad-
vantage over the courts in understanding what methods of use are covered
by an ANDA.
Resolution of these issues in Caraco v. Novo Nordisk forced the courts
on an unguided march through the weeds of FDA administrative practice
without the benefit of the views of the agency responsible for creating the
use code system as to how its regulations applied to the facts of that particu-
lar case.252 The patent claims in Caraco were not ambiguous, although
Novo-Nordisk’s misleading use code created an illusion of uncertainty about
which uses they covered.253 The regulatory artifact of use codes, devised by
FDA to avoid having to read patents, provided an opportunity to distort
claim coverage and mislead FDA. The real dispute was not about the mean-
ing of the claims, but about whether the use code narrative accurately tracks
the claims and their relationship to approved uses. FDA surely understood
use codes and their relationship to approved uses better than the courts.254 By
punting the entire matter to the courts, FDA thus required a less expert reso-
lution of issues that it could have resolved more authoritatively, and cer-
tainly more quickly and cheaply, on its own.
The scope of approval sought in an ANDA is not only relevant to the
choice between a section vii certification and a section viii statement. It is
also central to the ability of the courts to grant relief prior to market entry
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, which provides for early litigation of an in-
fringement claim against a firm that submits an ANDA “for a drug claimed
in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent.” Resolution of these
lawsuits requires not only determining what the patents claim, but also what
the ANDAs seek approval for. Although sometimes the scope of approval is
undisputed,255 when the scope is contested, judicial decisions reveal consid-
erable confusion about how to make sense of these documents. For example,
in Bayer Schering v. Lupin,256 a divided Federal Circuit panel affirmed dis-
252. See supra notes 121–142 and accompanying text.
253. On remand, the Federal Circuit noted that although FDA had found that Novo
Nordisk’s revised use code for the ‘358 patent covered all three approved uses of repaglinide,
it was undisputed that the patent claim at issue covered only one of those uses. Novo Nordisk
A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 688 F.3d 766, 768–69 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[I]n light of the admit-
ted facts in this case, . . . the Supreme Court decision forecloses any argument that Novo’s use
code is ‘correct.’ . . . The Food and Drug Administration (‘FDA’) has found Novo’s current
use code covers all three FDA-approved methods of using repaglinide. It is undisputed that
[the ‘358 patent] claims only one of those three approved methods of use.”)(internal citations
omitted).
254. Indeed, the Federal Circuit deferred to FDA on this issue in Caraco. Id. at 768.
255. E.g., Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (af-
firming dismissal of infringement action against ANDA applicants who had used section viii
statements for asserted patents that claimed methods of use for which they did not seek ap-
proval in their ANDAs on the ground that the complaints failed to state a claim under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)).
256. 676 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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missal of infringement actions against ANDA applicants who sought ap-
proval to market generic versions of the drug Yasmin “for oral
contraception,” when the asserted patents claimed a method of using the
drug for achieving simultaneously “a contraceptive effect, an anti-andro-
genic effect, and an anti-aldosterone effect.”257 Two panel members rejected
the argument that FDA had in fact approved use of the drug to achieve the
combination of these three effects, but the third panel member dissented on
the basis of a different interpretation of the scope of FDA approval.258 The
disagreement was over the significance of a highly technical disclosure in
the “Pharmacodynamics” subsection of the “Clinical Pharmacology” section
of the FDA-approved label that one of the two active ingredients exhibits
anti-mineralocorticoid activity and that animal studies suggest it may have
anti-androgenic activity. The panel majority, after reviewing FDA regula-
tions, concluded that this was a disclosure of side effects that did not indi-
cate FDA approval of the use of the drug to achieve these effects, but the
dissenting panel member disagreed, citing expert testimony of a former FDA
employee and a physician as to how they understood the label.259 The only
contested issue was the scope of FDA approval, not the scope of the patent.
Surely it would have been helpful for the courts to have the benefit of FDA’s
own interpretation of what methods of use were covered by the approval
documents.260 Yet because FDA would have had to read the patent claims to
determine their relationship to the scope of approval, the entire matter went
directly to litigation without prior administrative review.
Even on issues of claim interpretation, FDA has significant technologi-
cal expertise. Patent claims are directed to those who are skilled in the field
of the invention; if they fail to inform such persons with reasonable certainty
about the scope of the invention, the claims are invalid for lack of definite-
ness.261 FDA, as the agency charged with regulating new drug development,
surely is closer to the perspective of those skilled in the drug development
field than generalist trial courts. At a minimum, a trial court charged with
interpreting the language of a claim to a drug or method of use might benefit
from knowing how FDA understood the claim.
257. Id. at 1319–20.
258. Id. at 1322; id. at 1326, 1328–29 (Newman, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1326, 1328–29 (Newman, J., dissenting).
260. See also Braintree Labs. Inc. v. Novel Labs. Inc., 749 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
and id. at 1360–65 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (disagreement between panel majority and dissent over
whether dosage specified in ANDA meets particular claim limitation rather than over claim
interpretation).
261. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor
or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”); see Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s interpretation that only “insolubly am-
biguous” claims are invalid for lack of definiteness in favor of a “reasonable certainty”
standard).
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Claim interpretation is often contested in litigation, and the courts have
developed elaborate procedures for resolving disputes over the meaning of
claims that FDA cannot and should not attempt to duplicate. When the
meaning of a claim can be determined solely on the basis of the patent and
its prosecution history,262 claim interpretation presents a pure question of
law, subject to plenary review on appeal.263 But sometimes it is necessary to
consider additional extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony concerning
the meaning of terms of art to a person of ordinary skill in the art in the
relevant time period, and District Courts need to make subsidiary factual
determinations on these matters that are entitled to deferential review on
appeal.264 Under current practice, district courts rule on disputed issues of
claim interpretation following a proceeding known as a Markman hearing
that may include expert testimony and dictionary definitions of claim terms
as well as evidence from the patent’s prosecution history. Reversals on ap-
peal are common, and many observers believe that the process has failed to
produce certainty and predictability as to the meaning of claim language.265
But in some cases that perplex the courts, claim interpretation might pose
little difficulty for an impartial reader who has ordinary skill in the field.
Moreover, it may not be necessary to resolve every ambiguity in a claim
that includes limitations that make it clear that an ANDA does not in-
fringe.266 Consider the recent case of Braintree Laboratories v. Novel Labo-
ratories.267 In that case, a divided Federal Circuit panel reversed, vacated,
and remanded a summary judgment of infringement against an ANDA for a
generic version of a bowel prep kit for use prior to colonoscopy. Claim 15 of
the patent at issue recites:
262. The prosecution history of a patent is the PTO’s complete record of the application
process for a patent, including the original application itself, responses made by the examiner,
and any amendments made by the applicant. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki,
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
263. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc); Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
264. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
265. There is an extensive literature on the topic. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts: Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1743 (2009); Peter S. Menell, et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711 (2010); David L. Schwartz, Practice
Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases,
107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008).
266. In order to infringe a patent claim, a defendant’s product or process must meet every
element of the patent, either literally or by equivalence, and thus each element limits the scope
of the claim. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997); Bayer
AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2000). If the defendant’s
product or process fails to meet any one limitation of the claim, there is no infringement, and
therefore no need to consider whether additional claim elements are present. Fin Control Sys.
Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
267. 749 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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A composition for inducing purgation of the colon of a patient, the
composition comprising from about 100 mL to about 500 mL of an
aqueous hypertonic solution comprising an effective amount of
Na2SO4, an effective amount of MgSO4, and an effective amount of
K2SO4, wherein the composition does not produce any clinically
significant electrolyte shifts and does not include phosphate.268
Each member of the three judge panel wrote separately, primarily about
the interpretation of the claim terms “purgation,” “a patient,” and “clinically
significant electrolyte shifts.” One panel member, Judge Dyk, would have
held that the meaning of these claim terms was beside the point because the
ANDA product would not infringe the dosage limitation set forth in the
claim.269 The claims called for 100–-500 mL of the composition, while the
ANDA sought approval for a dose of two sixteen-ounce bottles, or a total of
946 mL.270 The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that each sin-
gle bottle satisfied the volume limitation and a single bottle was sufficient to
achieve “purgation” as the court interpreted that term in the claim,271 but
FDA had not approved administering a single bottle dose of the product, and
the ANDA did not and could not seek approval for an infringing dose. The
courts might have understood the issue better with the benefit of FDA’s
expertise in comparing an unambiguous dosage term in the patent claim to
the scope of approval sought in the ANDA.
In its scrupulous avoidance of engagement with any issues of patent
law, FDA is thus leaving the courts to resolve disputes concerning the scope
of FDA approval—issues that are squarely within the scope of FDA’s exper-
tise—without giving them the benefit of FDA’s analysis of those issues. It
may take a long time for the courts to sort it out, and they may get it wrong.
Meanwhile, regardless of the merits, plaintiffs benefit from the protection of
a thirty-month stay without having to persuade a court to enter a preliminary
injunction.
C. Relationship of Administrative Determinations to
Litigation Over Validity and Infringement
Proper administration of the Hatch-Waxman Act requires timely and im-
partial determinations of which patents are entitled to the Hatch-Waxman
boost. Deference to innovators fails the test of impartiality. Experience has
shown that in the absence of administrative oversight, innovators will submit
268. Id. at 1353.
269. Id. at 1360, 1361–63 (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the result).
270. Id. at 1362.
271. Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., No. 11-1341 (PGS), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7698, at *26–28, 2013 WL 211252, at *10–11 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2013), vacated, 749
F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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patents that do not meet the statutory criteria for disclosure and could not
reasonably be asserted against ANDA applicants in order to use the Hatch-
Waxman boost to defer generic entry.272 Resort to counterclaims in infringe-
ment actions to correct improper patent listings fails the test of timeliness.
The courts cannot determine which patents should get the Hatch-Waxman
boost in a time frame that avoids the cascade of regulatory consequences
triggered by listing a patent in the Orange Book and cannot undo the delays
caused by allowing the patents to be improperly listed in the first place.
Other patents come with remedies under the Patent Act, but they are not
entitled to the Hatch-Waxman boost. Only FDA is in a position to tell the
difference in a timely fashion. Moreover, punting these disputes to the courts
without prior administrative oversight deprives the courts of the benefit of
FDA’s expertise in understanding the scope of approval in an NDA or an
ANDA.
Application of the statutory standards does not require FDA to consider
challenges to the validity of a patent, nor does it require a full analysis of
infringement. But it does require that FDA read patents at two distinct
points. First, when an innovator submits a patent for listing, FDA must de-
termine whether the patent claims an approved drug or an approved method
of use and “could reasonably be asserted” against an unauthorized generic.
Those drug patents and method of use patents that survive the “reasonable
assertion” test may be listed in the Orange Book; those that fail the test are
not entitled to the Hatch-Waxman boost. Second, if there is a dispute about
whether an ANDA may use a section viii statement for a method of use
patent, FDA must determine whether the ANDA seeks approval for any
methods of use claimed in a listed patent. If FDA concludes that the ANDA
does not seek approval for a patented method of use, the patent holder is not
entitled to a thirty-month stay, and the generic may not claim regulatory
exclusivity unless the ANDA also includes a paragraph IV certification (per-
haps for another patent or claim).
Each of these determinations requires comparing the patent claims to the
scope of approval under the NDA or ANDA. If the patent holder sues the
generic for patent infringement for filing the ANDA, the court will again
need to compare the patent claims to the ANDA to rule on infringement.273
But FDA administrative determinations of the relationship between patent
claims and the scope of approval are by no means redundant to the work to
be done by the courts in cases that proceed to litigation.
First, administrative determinations of which patents are entitled to the
Hatch-Waxman boost will come much earlier and at considerably lower
272. See supra Part II.
273. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012). See Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Apotex Corp., 669
F.3d 1370, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]nfringement of method claims under § 271(e)(2)
requires filing an ANDA wherein at least one ‘use’ listed in the ANDA is claimed in a
patent.”).
Spring 2015] Patent Punting 255
cost. They will neither displace litigation nor determine its outcome. They
will, however, determine whether the patent holder may get an automatic
stay of ANDA approval without a court order.
Second, the issues to be resolved by FDA and the courts are not identi-
cal, although they overlap somewhat. FDA will not consider challenges to
patent validity.274 Administrative and judicial determinations will overlap
more if there is a dispute about infringement. FDA must determine whether
a patent meets the statutory criteria for listing in the Orange Book, including
whether it covers an approved drug or method of use and whether it “could
reasonably be asserted” against unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of the
drug. Because ANDAs seek approval only for previously approved products
and previously approved uses, a patent that meets these criteria may well be
infringed by the ANDA, unless the ANDA uses a section viii statement to
carve out a patented method of use. But while FDA need only determine
whether assertion of the patent would be reasonable, in cases that proceed to
litigation the court must go further and decide whether the ANDA product
(or its use) would infringe the patent. The “reasonable assertion” standard is
a coarser filter that need not exclude every patent that a court might ulti-
mately decide would not be infringed by the generic. FDA need not engage
in the same thorough claim interpretation and infringement analysis required
of district courts. But it must do more than simply defer to the patent holder
to determine whether its assertions are reasonable.
Third, administrative oversight is particularly important for cases that
never reach a judicial determination on the merits. Even if the patent holder
274. The PTO is in a better position than FDA to provide administrative review of patent
validity and has new statutory authority to perform that function in a timely and cost-effective
way under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, supra note 18. For the first nine
months after a patent is issued, any person other than the owner may petition the PTO to
institute a post-grant review (PGR) of the patent seeking to cancel one or more claims for
invalidity on any basis that could be raised in an infringement action. 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329.
After the nine-month window for initiating PGR is closed, it is still possible to challenge the
patent by filing a petition for inter partes review (IPR), 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319, but only on the
basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications, 35 U.S.C. § 311, and only if the
PTO determines that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
respect to at least one of the challenged claims, 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Initial experience suggests
that IPR is a powerful tool for challenging invalid patents while avoiding litigation costs. See
Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 93 (2014) (finding that when a petition was filed the PTO instituted IPR 84% of
the time, that in cases that had reached a final decision all claims had been invalidated or
disclaimed more than 77% of the time, and that litigation proceeding in parallel had been
stayed 82% of the time). Although so far only a small number of IPRs have involved chal-
lenges to drug patents, the availability of this new tool for challenging patent validity before an
expert agency weakens the case for assigning a similar job to FDA. For analysis of the advan-
tages of IPR in the context of Hatch-Waxman disputes, see Gurpreet Singh Walia, Inter Partes
Review an Option as a Substitute for Hatch-Waxman litigation (Nov. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/11/07/inter-partes-review-an-option-as-a-substitute-for
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
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brings an infringement action, the parties may enter into a settlement, per-
haps agreeing to defer generic competition without any judicial findings.
Prior administrative review will filter out some of these cases by limiting the
Hatch-Waxman boost to those patents that could reasonably be asserted, i.e.,
patents that present a plausible case for deferring generic entry. Although the
patent holder could still pursue an infringement action even if its patent is
not listed,275 it may decide not to bother if it does not thereby gain an auto-
matic thirty-month stay of regulatory approval. On the other hand, if the
listing of a patent means that FDA agrees that it covers an approved drug or
method of use, the position of the patent holder in litigation might be
stronger than it is in the current regime of administrative deference to inno-
vators. If generics expect the courts to defer to FDA’s determinations, they
might file fewer paragraph IV certifications, further limiting litigation.
Finally, in cases that proceed to litigation, prior administrative review
would give courts the benefit of FDA’s expert reading of NDAs and
ANDAs, which should improve the quality of judicial decisions. Courts may
also benefit from learning how FDA understood the claim language, given
its technical expertise in drug development. Although courts will engage in a
more elaborate process of claim interpretation in an infringement action,
FDA’s assessment prior to litigation of whether a claim could reasonably be
asserted against an unauthorized generic could be useful evidence of what
the claim language means to a person having ordinary skill in the field to
consider alongside other evidence presented by the parties.
D. Addressing FDA’s Concerns
We expect that the courts would acquiesce in more active administrative
oversight along the lines sketched out above, just as they have acquiesced,
albeit sometimes reluctantly, in FDA’s interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman
Act to limit its involvement in patent disputes to the “purely ministerial”
function of doing what the NDA holders tell them to do.276 For the reasons
275. Some judicial decisions have erroneously stated that a paragraph IV certification is
necessary to allow a patent holder to bring an action against an ANDA filer. Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990) (“§ 271(e)(2) [creates] a highly artificial act of
infringement that consists of submitting an ANDA or a paper NDA containing [a paragraph
IV] certification . . .”); Bristol Myers Squibb v. Royce Laboratories, 69 F.3d 1130, 1131 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“Inclusion of a paragraph IV certification in an ANDA, however, is deemed an act
of infringement.”). That is not, however, what the statute says. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), it
is an act of infringement “to submit [an ANDA] for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of
which is claimed in a patent . . . if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval . . . to
engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use
of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.” See AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370 (Fed Cir. 2012) (upholding jurisdiction over
infringement action brought under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) even though ANDA used a section
viii statement rather than a paragraph IV certification for the patent at issue).
276. See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text.
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explained above we think a more active role for FDA is necessary to prevent
firms from improperly claiming the Hatch-Waxman boost for patents that do
not meet the statutory criteria for deferring ANDA approvals. But FDA
plainly does not want a more active role in administering the Hatch-Waxman
patent provisions and is not likely to assume such a role unless Congress
compels it to do so. If Congress wants FDA to oversee the determination of
which patents get the Hatch-Waxman boost, it may need to say so. At the
same time, it should consider how best to address the objections that FDA
has raised to taking on a larger role in the process.
FDA’s first justification for patent punting is that it lacks patent exper-
tise. The expanded role we contemplate for FDA in overseeing Orange Book
listings and the use of section viii statements would require comparing the
claims of patents to the scope of approval under NDAs and ANDAs. The
interpretation of patent claims is one part of this analysis; the rest of the job
consists of determining whether the patent covers a drug product or method
of use that has been approved in an NDA and, in the case of disputes about
the adequacy of a section viii statement to address method of use claims,
whether the ANDA seeks approval for the patented method of use. We have
already argued that FDA has much greater expertise than the courts in un-
derstanding the meaning of NDAs and ANDAs. NDAs and ANDAs are
drafted according to the requirements of the FDCA277 as interpreted by
FDA.278 FDA may, however, need to hire patent lawyers or agents to inter-
pret patent claims. These FDA employees will not need to replicate the pro-
ceedings that a district court would follow in a full adjudication. FDA’s job
is to make an initial determination of whether a patent claims a drug product
or method of use and could reasonably be asserted against an unauthorized
generic. This task requires staff who are familiar with general principles of
claim interpretation and the ability to read claim language in light of the
specification, the prosecution history, and the meaning of claim language to
persons of ordinary skill in the field.
FDA also claims that it lacks the resources to address patent issues. It
stands to reason that FDA may need to hire additional personnel to carry out
a task that FDA is currently not performing. FDA may well need further
resources to allow it to hire skilled personnel to oversee the listing of patents
in the Orange Book and determine whether method of use patents can be
carved out of ANDA approvals. Time is of the essence in determining when
277. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), 355(j)(2)(A).
278. A list of FDA resources and Guidance Documents for the preparation of NDAs may
be found at www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandap-
proved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm (last visited July 29, 2014). A
list of FDA resources and Guidance Documents for the preparation of ANDAs may be found
at http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandap-
proved/approvalapplications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/default.htm (last vis-
ited July 29, 2014).
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generic products may be approved, and inadequate staffing will cause de-
lays. Congress could address resource needs at the same time that it clarifies
FDA’s oversight role. The cost of additional personnel could be covered by
assessing user fees on firms submitting patents for listing in the Orange
Book. User fees, in combination with regulatory oversight, might discourage
the submission of inappropriate patents more effectively than the current
requirement that such submissions be accompanied by declarations under
penalty of perjury attesting to their accuracy. User fees could also be as-
sessed to cover the costs of reviewing section viii statements when the patent
holder argues that a paragraph IV certification is necessary.
FDA also worries that if it takes a more active role, it will be sued by
firms that are unhappy with its decisions. Over the years FDA has defended
many lawsuits brought by firms that have been unhappy with its regulatory
moves, particularly when it sets a new course.279 FDA has certainly been
sued over its refusal to oversee the Orange Book.280 Given the commercial
significance of the Hatch-Waxman boost, some patent holders can be ex-
pected to argue that the statute limits FDA to the “purely ministerial” role it
has taken so far, especially if FDA were to change its interpretation without
prodding from Congress. Although the courts have so far deferred to FDA’s
interpretation of the current statute, they have also expressed criticisms, and
we think it is likely that they would also defer to a revised interpretation of
the existing statute that gives FDA a larger oversight role. But Congress
could surely protect FDA from such lawsuits in any new legislation to pro-
vide for more active FDA oversight.
Congress could also take steps to shield FDA from lawsuits challenging
its decisions in individual cases about the proper listing of patents in the
Orange Book or appropriate carve-out in an ANDA of particular patents,
although whether it should do so presents a closer question than whether it
could do so. FDA could certainly make erroneous determinations, with
costly consequences either way. On the other hand, judicial review could
add costs and delays that would cancel the benefits of timely and cost-effec-
tive administrative oversight. Moreover, the expanded FDA role we advo-
cate would not prevent patent holders from enforcing their rights under the
Patent Act through infringement actions in the courts. FDA would not rule
on the validity of patents, nor would it undertake comprehensive infringe-
ment analysis. It would simply determine which patents should cause delays
279. See, e.g., Edison Pharmaceutical Co. v. FDA, 600 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (chal-
lenging requirement for double-blind testing and exclusion of physician testimonials to estab-
lish safety and efficacy); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(challenging withdrawal of approval of combination product following change in statute for
lack of showing that effects of one of the ingredients had medical significance); Food & Drug
Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000 (challenging initiative to
regulate cigarettes as drug-device combination products).
280. See supra Part II.B.
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in ANDA approvals. A patent holder who believes its patent was improperly
excluded from the Orange Book could still sue for infringement based on the
filing of the ANDA and seek a preliminary injunction against the generic.281
Current law provides authority for the court to order that the effective date of
approval of the ANDA be deferred until the expiration of the patent.282 The
availability of a preliminary injunction in an infringement action is an ade-
quate judicial safeguard against harm to patent holders from erroneous FDA
determinations that a patent could not reasonably be asserted against an un-
authorized generic, without the need for a separate lawsuit to contest the
administrative decision itself.
Congress might also wish to address the timing of FDA decisions about
the proper listing of patents. NDA applicants currently file patent informa-
tion along with their NDAs, and amend their filings to include patents filed
after that date but before NDA approval. The statute requires FDA to publish
this information upon approval of the application. The statute further re-
quires NDA holders to file information for patents issued after NDA ap-
proval within thirty days, and for FDA to publish the information upon its
submission. The statute makes no provision for a review period to determine
whether a patent qualifies for listing in the Orange Book.283 For patents dis-
closed early enough in the initial term of regulatory exclusivity, FDA could
publish the patent information when it is submitted and later remove it from
the Orange Book if it determines following review that the patent did not
meet the statutory criteria for listing. But for later-issued patents, there may
not be time for FDA to review the patent and determine whether it qualifies
for listing before the date when an ANDA could be filed or even approved if
the patent were not listed. If such patents are initially listed, they may get at
least a portion of the Hatch-Waxman boost before FDA can conduct its re-
view and determine that they should be delisted. Under current law, ANDAs
filed in the interim would need to include either a section vii certification or
a section viii statement for such patents, and the generic would have to give
notice in case of a paragraph IV certification, likely triggering an infringe-
ment action and a thirty-month stay of approval. But FDA could terminate
the stay if it later determines that the patent should not have been listed or
that the ANDA does not seek approval for the patented method of use, leav-
ing the patent holder to seek relief from the District Court. An alternative
would be to defer the listing of patents in the Orange Book until after FDA
determines that they qualify for listing. This approach would withhold the
Hatch-Waxman boost from later-issued patents during the lag time between
281. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(III)–(IV) (addressing effective date of ANDA ap-
proval when district court has granted a preliminary injunction).
282. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A) (2012).
283. Indeed, this time frame arguably provides textual support for FDA’s “purely minis-
terial” understanding of its role in administering these provisions. See supra notes 59–62 and
accompanying text.
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disclosure of the patent and FDA’s determination of its relevance to the
NDA or ANDA. Some ANDA approvals might become effective during this
period, leaving patent holders to pursue their patent infringement remedies
to prevent generic entry without the benefit of a stay of regulatory approval.
Either way, the statute should specify a finite but reasonable period of time
for FDA to make its determination. The one hundred and eighty day period
currently specified in the statute for reviewing an ANDA seems like a rea-
sonable period of time for deciding whether a patent is entitled to the Hatch-
Waxman boost. Prompt determinations will allow the parties to plan for ge-
neric entry and will make FDA’s assessment of the relevance of patents to
its approval documents available to the courts in cases that proceed to
litigation.
Our proposal would replace FDA’s current practice of patent punting
with a rough administrative assessment of the merits of patent issues that
determine the timing of regulatory approval. It would not displace other in-
stitutional mechanisms within the heart of the patent system for reviewing
the same issues, including review of patent validity in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) and litigation of patent infringement actions in the
courts. But it would require some engagement with patents and patent law
outside of those institutional mechanisms.
This proposal would not eliminate the problem of anticompetitive settle-
ments of patent infringement actions, but we expect it would reduce the
amount of litigation that leads to such settlement by reducing incentives to
litigate the weakest cases. We do not propose to limit the right of patent
holders to pursue remedies for patent infringement in the courts, but we
expect that fewer patent holders would pursue infringement actions if they
did not thereby gain the benefits of the Hatch-Waxman boost for cases with
little merit. By withholding the Hatch-Waxman boost for patents that are not
relevant to particular NDAs and ANDAs, FDA would make infringement
litigation less attractive to patent holders in these cases, and the remaining
cases would be more likely to have merit. Presumably parties will continue
to settle those cases that are filed, but the problem of anticompetitive settle-
ments should diminish with a reduction in the benefits of filing weak cases.
CONCLUSION
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent law and FDA regulation work
together to determine the timing of generic entry in the market for drugs. But
FDA has sought to avoid any responsibility for reading patents, preferring to
defer to drug developing firms’ assessments of which patents should defer
approval of competing generic versions of their products. This gap in regula-
tory oversight has allowed innovators to defer competition through the list-
ing of irrelevant patents. Provisions for litigation of patent disputes have
failed to provide a timely corrective for abuses made possible by the lack of
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administrative oversight. Meanwhile, patent litigation has led to anticompe-
titive settlements, forestalling adjudication of the patent issues and provok-
ing antitrust litigation. Antitrust courts have proven no more willing than
FDA to address the merits of the underlying patent infringement actions,
preferring to rely on misleading proxies such as the existence of a “reverse
payment” in the settlement agreement.
We propose to increase the role of FDA in making timely determina-
tions of which patents meet the statutory criteria for deferring generic entry,
while leaving the patent system and its remedies intact. With proper staffing
and resources, FDA could use its expertise in drug regulation to make rough
assessments of the relationship between particular patents and the scope of
FDA approval in NDAs and ANDAs more quickly and cheaply than the
courts could rule on related infringement actions. Only those patents that
FDA decides could reasonably be asserted against an unauthorized generic
would lead FDA to stay approval of the ANDA pending litigation of the
infringement action, but litigation would still be available even if FDA de-
cides the patent does not meet the criteria for listing, and the court could
enter a preliminary injunction with the same effect as a stay of approval. We
expect that without the stay of regulatory approval, patent holders will de-
cide not to pursue some actions that lack merit, limiting opportunities for
anticompetitive settlements.
But perhaps we are addressing this problem from the wrong angle.
Maybe the problem is not with the Hatch-Waxman Act, but with patent law.
We have known for many years that patent issues are challenging and aver-
sive for non-experts. Congress has tried to manage this problem by ghetto-
izing patent disputes into expert tribunals. Thirty years ago, Congress
created the specialized Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to hear ap-
peals in patent cases. More recently, Congress started experimenting with
mechanisms to bring more expertise into the resolution of patent cases at the
trial court level and creating more opportunities for administrative review of
patentability within the PTO. But these strategies break down when patent
law spills over into other legal regimes.
One lesson we might learn from this case study of patent punting is that
the complexity and opacity of the patent system makes it problematic to use
patents as a benchmark for determining the scope of legal rights outside the
patent system. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the timing of regulatory ap-
provals depends on patents, but it is difficult to implement that regime ap-
propriately when regulators are loath to look at patents. Application of the
antitrust laws similarly turns, in part, on the validity and scope of patents,
but it is difficult to work out what that means when antitrust courts do not
evaluate patents. The law is a seamless web, and a regime as important as
the patent system has an appropriate bearing on other laws. But if decision-
makers are reluctant to analyze patent issues that properly have a bearing on
their analysis, the impact of the patent system will inevitably be distorted.
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Perhaps the trend toward ghettoizing patent disputes within expert tribu-
nals has allowed complexity and opacity to flourish. Greater reliance on gen-
eralists to apply patent law might create pressure to simplify and clarify,
making it easier for everyone to understand patents and the rights they con-
fer, and limiting opportunities for strategic abuse of ambiguities. Perhaps the
patent system could be more effective in achieving its goals if it were less
complex and opaque. To some extent, the complexity of the patent system is
a function of technological complexity. But when even a technologically
expert agency like FDA shies away from engaging with patent issues, the
problem goes beyond technological complexity. Perhaps the ghettoizing of
patent law has made it seem more daunting to the uninitiated than it is or
needs to be. Perhaps in those areas where patent law necessarily interacts
with non-patent law, we would do better to direct those who administer the
adjacent non-patent legal regimes to roll up their sleeves and start dealing
with patents.
